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DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE 
OLIVIER SYLVAIN* 
ABSTRACT 
 Online video streaming applications enable users to watch over-
the-air broadcast programs at any time and almost on any device.  
As such, they challenge the pertinence of traditional video distribu-
tion law and the broadcast network system on which it is based.  
Congress enacted the Transmit Clause of the 1976 Copyright Act to 
resolve the high-stakes tussle between broadcasters and cable provid-
ers.  But, today, that provision is ill-suited to resolving whether un-
authorized streaming infringes on broadcasters’ copyright to perform 
works publicly.  Its scope is ambiguous enough that judges across the 
country were notably divided on whether it reaches online video dis-
tribution—that is, until the Supreme Court ruled that it does in a 
divided opinion last term in ABC v. Aereo. 
 Remarkably, none of the courts to address the question, including 
the Supreme Court, consulted the interpretations of video distribu-
tion law by the agencies to which Congress delegated the broad au-
thority of doing so pursuant to closely related statutes.  The courts 
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assumed that they alone should interpret the scope of the Transmit 
Clause in the absence of a specific delegation from Congress. 
 This Article argues that courts instead should consult all of the 
public law that Congress set in motion in the area of video distribu-
tion law before resolving novel disputes over the scope of the Trans-
mit Clause.  This reform would have purchase when, as is the case 
today, the Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Com-
mission have authority to interpret online video distribution under 
the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively.  Alt-
hough neither agency has the authority to interpret the Transmit 
Clause, current administrative law doctrine suggests that those 
agencies’ interpretations of closely related statutes are worthy of re-
spect, if not deference.  This Article accordingly argues for a more 
careful approach to substantive judicial review in this area than the 
courts have employed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s popular retail internet applications are completely dif-
ferent from the mass market communication technologies that pre-
ceded them.  Twentieth century broadcasting enabled audiences to 
tune in together to live and recorded programs.  It dramatically en-
larged the size of audiences that could experience live and recorded 
programming simultaneously.  Broadcast television in this regard was 
the great hearth of American culture for most of the twentieth centu-
ry.1  The major networks were to be the trustees of the public airwaves 
that curated every minute of programming for the mass public in or-
der to keep viewers interested. 
As transformative as broadcasting was, however, the Internet has 
turned the political economy and cultural practices of video distribu-
tion inside out.  Today, audiences are not so beholden to broadcast 
programmers.  Current video distribution technologies have un-
moored performance from time and place so that each viewer is in far 
more control over when and how she watches television programs 
than she was before.  Viewers can now experience performances at 
the time and in the order of their choosing on almost whatever net-
worked device they wish. 
After years at the center of the mass communication political 
economy, the broadcast incumbents today act as though they have 
everything to lose.  They have done almost everything in their power 
to moderate the disruptive effects of online video distribution. 
One of the primary resources to which they have turned to retain 
their market position is public law.  They have done so in at least 
three ways.  First, they have lobbied Congress to enact statutes or 
amend existing ones to account for new technologies as they emerge.  
Congress accordingly has added new exclusive copyrights and 
amended the scope of existing ones with specific technologies in 
mind.  Second, the incumbents have petitioned the pertinent admin-
istrative agencies to adopt interpretations of existing law that further 
                                                        
 1.  See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, LISTENING IN: RADIO AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION 
(2004); J. FRED MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
NETWORK TV (1993). 
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secure their market position.  Pursuant to their delegated authority 
under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively, 
the Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) routinely hear such petitions and comments in proceedings 
involving novel communications technologies.  Third, the incumbents 
have challenged the emergent technologies in court, relying on in-
terpretations of existing law that inure to their benefit.  It is to this 
strategy—appeal to courts—on which I focus in this Article.  The ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme Court’s 
American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc.2 decision from June 2014 
provide an important opportunity to assess how courts might address 
technological novelty in the absence of clarity in existing public law.  
There, broadcasters argued that an upstart online video distributor 
infringed on their copyright to “perform” works “publicly” when it 
made broadcasters’ programs available without authorization.  The 
Court agreed with broadcasters. 
Rather than focus on the substantive outcome of the litigation, I 
focus here on the interpretive strategies that the courts (the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Aereo in particular) have employed to make 
sense of the Transmit Clause,3 a provision that Congress wrote well 
before any of its members knew anything about networked communi-
cations, let alone online video streaming.  Judges, I will show, were si-
lent on efforts by the Copyright Office and the FCC to make sense of 
online video streaming in proceedings involving related provisions in 
the Copyright Act and the Communications Act.  They assumed that 
courts alone could or should make sense of a statutory provision ab-
sent a specific delegation to the agencies to interpret the provision. 
The courts’ silence is remarkable at least because judges have 
long recognized that they are not always good at making legal sense of 
disruptive communication technologies.  To be sure, sometimes they 
can, should, and do define legal obligations and rights in the first in-
stance, without consulting other institutions.  Adjudications concern-
ing the scope of individual constitutional rights like privacy or fact-
dependent considerations like copyright fair use, for example, are the 
province of the courts.4  Judges in these cases are not and should not 
                                                        
 2.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 3.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012). 
 4.  It is worth noting here that, although fair use is explicitly defined in the Copyright 
Act, observers have generally recognized it to be a judge-created doctrine that is only really 
elaborated in adjudication.  I discuss the fair use doctrine below.  See infra notes 277–281 
and accompanying text.   
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be any more reticent to resolve disputes involving disruptive technol-
ogies than they are for conventional ones. 
In other legislative fields, however, courts are careful not to im-
pose their interpretations of existing statutes without first consulting 
institutions created for that very purpose.  Scholars generally associate 
this reticence with deference.5  Deference has a special meaning in 
administrative law doctrine, referring generally to courts’ relative high 
regard for agency conclusions.6  For constitutional law and legal pro-
cess scholars, the concept of deference is a trans-substantive idea that 
connotes respect for the formal authority or decisionmaking capacity 
of other institutions.7 
In both kinds of cases—those where they decide in the first in-
stance without consulting other institutions and those in which they 
actively defer to agencies—courts are almost always explicitly mindful 
of the limits of their institutional authority and capacity to resolve 
disputes involving novel communication technologies.  I argue here 
that, in the recent online video distribution cases on the scope of the 
Transmit Clause, courts should have been far more respectful than 
they were of recent and ongoing proceedings at the Copyright Office 
and the FCC on how to treat those technologies under sister provi-
sions in the Copyright Act and the Communications Act. 
Courts, as it turns out, are not the only ones that jump the gun to 
resolve substantive policy disputes involving novel internet applica-
tions.  Legal commentators, too, have sometimes been far too eager 
to determine what the “proper balance” between content owners, in-
novators, and users ought to be.8  To be sure, some information law 
                                                        
 5.  See generally LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACT 320 
(1965). 
 6.  See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skid-
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 7.  See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 765–66 (1997); Eric Berger, Individual 
Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032–33 (2011); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1061, 1072 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional 
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483 (2010) (referring to the “ordinary” compo-
nents of administrative law as “statutory and regulatory requirements, such as the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) or Executive Order 12,866 and associated administrative law 
doctrines”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Fed-
eral Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Ac-
countability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 885 (2003). 
 8.  See, e.g., Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, Copyright Enforcement and Online File 
Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 627, 
  
720 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:715 
scholars have remarked on the relative institutional roles that legisla-
tures, agencies, and courts play in resolving disputes involving net-
worked communications.9  But scholars have avoided or been silent 
on the point in the context of video distribution. 
The problem with this myopic focus on substantive policy out-
comes is that it has a very narrow view of what the Internet is.  I as-
sume here that it is far more than an innovation machine.10  The In-
ternet constitutes and inhabits all aspects of our public and private 
lives.  Parties accordingly are now more than ever asking courts to re-
solve high-stakes disputes like those at issue in the Aereo litigation be-
cause innovation is an indeterminate objective.  What is more, these 
disputes involve competing public policy priorities and interests for 
which there is often no easy answer in existing law.  The focus on sub-
stantive policy outcomes accordingly ignores the far more relevant 
question today of how to make legal sense of laws when novel com-
munication technologies like live video streaming emerge and the 
pertinent existing public laws provide no clear answer.  I propose 
here a reform that would have courts leave these problems to Con-
gress and the agencies to whom it has delegated the responsibility of 
resolving such questions in the first instance.  This Article considers 
the recent video distribution cases and Aereo in particular to explain 
the point. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, I illustrate that, in 
the recent online streaming video cases, courts proceeded in their 
analysis of the public performance right on the assumption that they 
are best situated to resolve questions about novel technologies.  I fo-
cus in particular on the recent litigation involving Aereo. 
                                                        
631 (2012); Sebastian Wyatt Novak, Note, “A Million Little Antennas:” The Second Circuit’s 
Decision in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., and the Next Great United States Supreme Court Cop-
yright Battle, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 287 (2013). 
 9.  See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 
(2007) (using the theory of economic externalities to posit a theory of IP property rights 
distribution); Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, New Technologies and Constitutional Law, 
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner 
& Cheryl Saunders eds., 2013); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 
2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, at ¶ 30 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New 
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06, 
855 (2004); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
91, 96 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided 
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 751 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Gov-
ernance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (2001); A. Michael 
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitu-
tion, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2164 (2004); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009).   
 10.  Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2015). 
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In Part II, I situate the Transmit Clause in its historical and legis-
lative context.  I show that it was just one part of a broader reform ad-
dressed to the emergence of cable television and the consequent shift 
in the political economy of broadcast programming distribution.  I al-
so show that Congress later amended the Copyright Act as well as the 
Communications Act to account for the emergence of disruptive vid-
eo programming distribution technologies.  And while it has incorpo-
rated the Internet and networked communications technologies in 
these amendments, I show that Congress has yet to amend the scope 
of broadcast transmission law to include the Internet.  Instead, Con-
gress has deferred that responsibility to the Copyright Office and the 
FCC.  And, accordingly, both agencies have had a thing or two to say 
about broadcasters’ relative rights in the market for online video dis-
tribution.11  These agency findings, I argue, should make courts far 
more sanguine than they have been about deciding the scope of the 
public performance right de novo, as though they are the only act in 
town. 
In Part III, I demonstrate that courts already have developed an 
appreciation for the limits of their relative institutional authority and 
capacity in other information law subfields like electronic communi-
cation surveillance and broadband network management.  This un-
derscores the inadequacy of the courts’ approach to the public per-
formance right.  Thus, later in Part III, I propose that courts interpose 
interpretations by the Copyright Office and the FCC concerning the 
proper legal treatment of online video streaming under the sister 
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Communications Act.  In the 
end, my argument here is for more humility in courts’ consideration 
of disputes concerning disruptive video distribution technologies than 
they have evinced to this point. 
I.  AEREO AND THE CASE OF ONLINE VIDEO STREAMING 
Viewers today have far more control over when and how they 
watch television sitcoms, dramas, live sports, and movies than they did 
a generation ago.12  User adoption of digital video recorders like 
                                                        
 11.  The Copyright Office, for example, does not think the compulsory licensing law 
under the Copyright Act, the sister provision of the public performance right, covers in-
ternet transmissions.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT (2008), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/section109-final-report.pdf. 
 12.  See Alex Williams, For Millennials, the End of the TV Viewing Party, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/fashion/for-millennials-the-end-of-the-tv-
viewing-party.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad&_r=0.  
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TiVO and DVR cable service is not the only reason for this shift.  Net-
worked devices manufactured by Simple.tv and Roku, internet-based 
video-on-demand applications like those offered by Hulu and Ama-
zon, and “over-the-top” online video services like those being devel-
oped by Sony and Verizon enable users to watch live or record-and-
playback television programming whenever and however they want.13  
According to one recent report, subscribers with high-speed internet 
connections now outnumber those with cable television.14 
Until last summer, online streaming video distribution applica-
tions like Aereo and FilmOn were at the vanguard of such services.  
Aereo transcoded over-the-air broadcast signals into a digital form for 
subscribers who, in turn, wanted to watch on their laptops or other 
mobile devices.  For many observers, however, Aereo’s online stream-
ing service was nothing more than a tool used by its developers to ex-
ploit broadcasters’ proprietary content without paying for it.15  Ac-
cordingly, broadcast networks and their affiliated local stations filed 
lawsuits across the country alleging that Aereo and FilmOn infringed 
their exclusive right under the Copyright Act to perform broadcast 
programs publicly.16  In many regards, the broadcasters’ strategy 
proved very successful: Aereo has shuttered its business and filed for 
bankruptcy at the end of 2014.17 
The problem is that the pertinent provision, the Transmit Clause 
of the 1976 Copyright Act,18 is not particularly clear about how courts 
ought to consider user-controlled video applications like Aereo.  The 
statute’s definition of what constitutes a public performance is inap-
                                                        
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Shalini Ramachandran, More Cable Companies Take TV Off Menu, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
3, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/more-cable-companies-take-tv-off-menu-
1412120310.  
 15.  Cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (broad-
casters brought suit against cable operators for violating public performance right under 
1909 Copyright Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 
(1968) (same); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (broadcasters brought suit against first generation of online 
streaming video sites). 
 16.  See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Fox Television Sta-
tions v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 
874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 17.  See infra note 120. 
 18.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (public performance right); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101(2)(2012) (providing that to perform publicly under § 106 of the Copyright Act is “to 
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, 
by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving 
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the 
same time or at different times”). 
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posite to the workings and predominant consumer uses of online vid-
eo.19  Congress, after all, drafted it in an era when broadcasters con-
trolled the time and manner by which the public watched broadcast 
fare.20  Aereo ostensibly did something new; their subscribers could 
watch broadcast network sports or TV dramas in whatever idiosyncrat-
ic way they chose: they could watch live or watch at a later time from 
any point in the program.21  And they could do all of this on virtually 
any device that has an internet connection.22 
The Transmit Clause is ambiguous enough on the question that 
judges across the country were divided on how to handle the various 
cases that broadcasters brought.23  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit and a district court in Massachusetts decided 
that the provision does not include the new applications, while district 
courts in the District of Columbia and California decided that they 
do.24 
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on ap-
peal from the Second Circuit in January of 2014 and, in a 6–3 deci-
sion, sided with broadcasters.  In his opinion for the majority, Justice 
Breyer likened Aereo to cable service, the video distribution technol-
ogy that Congress explicitly brought under coverage of the 1976 Cop-
yright Act.25  The “behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers tele-
vision programming to its viewers’ screens” was unknown to 
policymakers in 1976, but, he asserted, the general act of retransmit-
ting broadcast signals to subscribers without authorization was not.26 
Justice Scalia, writing for the three dissenters, rejected the analo-
gy to cable, choosing instead to liken Aereo’s service to a “copy shop” 
                                                        
 19.  See supra note 18. 
 20.  See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
 21.  See Jerry Markon, Robert Barnes, & Cecilia Kang, Supreme Court Rules Against Start-
Up Aereo, Saying It Is Violating Copyright Laws, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-rules-against-startup-aereo-
saying-it-is-violating-copyright-laws/2014/06/25/59756f88-fc6b-11e3-8176-
f2c941cf35f1_story.html (explaining that Aereo rebroadcasts live television at a cheap 
monthly rate, where the subscribers can access these programs more conveniently). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See, e.g., WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).   
 24.  Compare id., with Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 25.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history makes 
clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider.  Rather, Aereo, and not just its sub-
scribers, ‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s]’).  Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those 
of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”). 
 26.  Id. at 2508. 
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that allows customers to use a copier on its premises.27   Such stores 
would not be infringing any more than Aereo is.28 
As interesting as the substantive question about the scope of pro-
tection under current law is or ought to be, both the majority opinion 
and dissent overlooked the important role that federal agencies play 
in the legislative field.  The Copyright Office and the FCC have for 
decades been applying the Copyright Act and the Communications 
Act to disruptive video distribution technologies.  For better or worse, 
Congress long ago decided that these agencies are best situated to 
understand new video applications as they emerge, monitor their im-
pact on the market, and recalibrate the scope of legal protections in 
furtherance of legislative purposes.29  They are charged with making 
legal sense of new technologies in the first instance.30 
The Justices and all of the federal judges who have heard the 
question, however, showed no respect for this arrangement.  Indeed, 
neither the Aereo majority opinion nor the dissent even acknowledged 
it.  They instead chose to interpret the scope of the public perfor-
mance right without any real consideration of the agencies’ findings 
or reports on the question.31  I posit here that they did so based on 
the myopic assumption that they alone have the duty of finding the 
proper balance between owners and creators in the first instance—or 
at least that they are as well situated as anyone else to make legal sense 
of disruptive new technologies.32 
A.  The Aereo Service 
Aereo streamed over-the-air broadcast programming to its paying 
subscribers.33  The company relied on three important design features 
to provide the service.  First, it assigned an individual antenna to a 
subscriber once it received a request from that subscriber to watch or 
record a program.34  Subscribers would make their request by clicking 
a computer mouse or tapping their mobile device’s display.35  No two 
users would share the same antenna at the same time, even if they re-
                                                        
 27.  Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28.  Id. at 2513–14. 
 29.  See infra Part II. 
 30.  See infra Part III. 
 31.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504–11. 
 32.  See infra Part I.D. 
 33.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See id. 
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quested to watch or record the very same program at the same time.36  
Second, Aereo transcoded the broadcast signal of the requested pro-
gram and created an individual digital copy of that program in the 
requesting subscriber’s personal directory.37  Again, even when two 
users are watching or recording the same program at the same time, 
the stream that they receive through Aereo flows from the copy of the 
program in their own Aereo directory.38  Finally, a subscriber could 
watch the copy of the desired program on his TV, computer, or mo-
bile-device screen; no other Aereo user could ever view that particular 
copy.39  In short, Aereo afforded users control over when and through 
which device they watched programs.40  And it did so without authori-
zation from broadcasters. 
Aereo designed their service in this way in order to abide by the 
terms of the Second Circuit’s decision in a 2008 case involving a cable 
television remote storage digital video recorder service (“RS-DVR”).41  
Cablevision, the principle defendant in that case, provided subscrib-
ers with RS-DVR service to copy and transmit broadcast and non-
broadcast programming.42  The Cablevision panel concluded that this 
service did not constitute a public performance within the meaning of 
the Copyright Act because, first, individual subscribers make their 
own copy of a broadcast network program through a click of their 
remote control and, second, the RS-DVR service automatically trans-
mits that individual copy to the unique subscriber whenever the latter 
requests it.43  Cable operators have virtually no active role in an auto-
mated individual transmission. 
As novel as its service seemed, Aereo’s entry into the market was 
not terribly surprising.  First, applications for online streaming of 
broadcast and nonbroadcast television content had been available for 
                                                        
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 
expert reports); see also Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for 
the Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4408 (2009). 
 41.  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (re-
ferred to colloquially as “Cablevision”).  
 42.  Id. at 124. 
 43.  In a useful analogy, the Cablevision court likened RS-DVR service to a store that 
charges customers to use a photocopier on-site.  Id. at 132.  As with such a store, Cablevi-
sion could not be held liable for violating plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act be-
cause RS-DVR service automates subscriber requests, effectively removing any volitional 
conduct on the part of Cablevision.  Id. 
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years already.44  Second, cable companies and broadcasters already 
were engaged in a very fraught battle over licensing and retransmis-
sion terms in ways that disadvantaged consumers.  Specifically, broad-
casters and other programmers blacked out their signals to gain lev-
erage in their negotiations over retransmission.45  Aereo simply 
sought to capitalize on the dispute, advertising itself as the modern-
day alternative to the greedy old incumbents.46 
Legislators in Congress, meanwhile, had been (and continue to 
be) considering bills that would address online video distribution.  
One bill would forbid cable and satellite operators, broadband pro-
viders, and other major media companies from engaging in anticom-
petitive practices against online video distributors, effectively giving 
the latter the same protections afforded to satellite providers.47  It 
would also open the possibility for online video distributors to negoti-
ate with broadcasters on streaming terms.  The basic objective of this 
proposal is to afford users a mix of choices for video programming.  
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, meanwhile, re-
leased a white paper that detailed current inadequacies in the 
amended Communications Act, focusing in particular on the way in 
which the 1934 Act treats different communications platforms (i.e., 
broadcasting, cable, and wireless) differently.48 
B.  The Lawsuit 
Broadcasters were not going to wait for legislative action.  The 
major networks and their affiliated local stations in the largest televi-
sion markets sued Aereo and FilmOn, another prominent online vid-
                                                        
 44.  See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 
WL 255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
 45.  See Christopher Zara, Fox News Blackout Takes a Bite Out of Dish Network’s Pay-TV Sub-
scribers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/fox-news-blackout-
takes-bite-out-dish-networks-pay-tv-subscribers-1827108.  
 46.  Aereo took out a full-page New York Times advertisement to emphasize the point.  
Greg Sandoval, News War: Aereo Takes out Full-Page New York Times Ad as Network Threats Heat 
up, THE VERGE (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/18/4238774/aereo-
takes-out-full-page-new-york-times-ad-against-network-threats.  
 47.  Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, S. 1680, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Bryce Bas-
chuk, Rockefeller Unveils Aereo Friendly Online Video Legislation for Expanded Choice, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rockefeller-unveils-aereo-
n17179880063/. 
 48.  H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, MODERNIZING THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
(2014), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/a
nalysis/CommActUpdate/20140108WhitePaper.pdf (“The primary body of law regulating 
these industries was passed in 1934 and while updated periodically, it has not been mod-
ernized in 17 years.”).  
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eo streaming service, within a year after those services first became 
available.  In cases filed in federal district courts in New York, Boston, 
Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere broadcasters alleged 
that Aereo and FilmOn directly infringed on broadcasters’ right to 
perform their programs publicly every time the upstarts streamed 
broadcast content without permission.49 
The pertinent statutory provision of the Copyright Act, the 
Transmit Clause, defines the right to perform work “publicly” as, 
[the right] to transmit or otherwise communicate a perfor-
mance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of 
any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in 
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or 
at different times.50 
According to plaintiffs, Aereo’s method of distributing broadcast pro-
gramming to subscribers violates the plain terms of the statute.  It 
makes no difference, they alleged, if Aereo uses one big antenna (like 
a cable company, for example) or many small antennas to receive 
broadcast signals if, in either case, the company is retransmitting the 
same program to members of the public.51 
The district courts to hear the cases were of two minds: some 
were inclined to reject plaintiffs’ suit, while others were alarmed by 
the new online video applications at issue.  The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York denied broadcasters’ mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, relying on the Second Circuit’s 
opinion from 2008 in Cablevision.52  It found that the similarities be-
tween the RS-DVR service in that earlier case and Aereo’s streaming 
service were significant.  The latter’s subscribers, it explained, can 
stop, store, and playback programs in the same way that cable sub-
                                                        
 49.  WNET Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶¶ 43–48, Am. Broad. Cos. 
v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 1543) (citing 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 502 (2012)).  American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”) and 
WNET were co-plaintiffs in a suit against Aereo, Inc.  Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375–76.  
WNET also alleged infringement of their reproduction right under the Act as well as un-
fair competition, WNET Compl., supra, at ¶¶ 49–63, but the public performance claim 
drew the most attention.  See also WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d 
Cir. 2013).   
 50.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2).  For the purposes of the act, “publicly” refers to “at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered.”  Id. § 101(1). 
 51.  WNET Compl., supra note 49, at ¶ 3. 
 52.  Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87.  Plaintiffs chose not to pursue their re-
production right at the preliminary injunction stage.  See id. at 376 (discussing the limited 
scope of the opinion). 
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scribers can control video through DVR service.53  A few months later, 
the United States District Court for the District of Boston reached the 
same conclusion.54 
Broadcasters found success in cases in D.C. and California.  A 
judge in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, for example, found that FilmOn infringed broadcasters’ 
public performance right.55  Explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit’s 
reading of the Transmit Clause in Cablevision, the L.A.-based court 
explained that the underlying work and its transmission are not sepa-
rate “performances” under Section 101; the statute is addressed to 
“the performance of the copyrighted work, irrespective of which copy 
of the work the transmission is made from.”56  The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia found the California court’s 
reasoning persuasive, but nevertheless provided its own rationale for 
its decision.57  That court also imposed a nationwide injunction on 
online video streaming services like those provided by FilmOn and 
Aereo, excepting, of course, the states in the Second Circuit.58  (The 
California district court for its part had limited its injunction to the 
Ninth Circuit.59)  Aereo, meanwhile, filed defensive lawsuits across the 
country, seeking to stave off the broadcasters’ expensive no-holds-bar 
litigation strategy.60 
Broadcasters appealed the adverse decisions.  Even while most 
federal courts across the country had not endorsed the Second Cir-
cuit’s Cablevision approach, broadcasters could not tolerate an adverse 
                                                        
 53.  Id. at 386. 
 54.  See Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 55.  See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Cablevision).  It decided the case before the Se-
cond Circuit published its opinion in April 2013. 
 56.  Id. at 1144.  FilmOn appealed the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit.  In 
light of Ninth Circuit precedent with which the Second Circuit explicitly disagreed in Ca-
blevision, see Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 138–39 (2d. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing On Command 
Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991)), it was proba-
ble that the two most prominent federal appellate courts on intellectual property matters 
would have been split on the scope of the public performance right.  Such a split never 
came to pass, however, as the Ninth Circuit stayed the case before it pending the Supreme 
Court’s resolution of the appeal from the Second Circuit. 
 57.  Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33, 37, 44–52 
(D.D.C. 2013).   
 58.  Id. at 52. 
 59.  See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. 
 60.  See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Aereo, Inc. v. CBS Broadcasting, 
No. 13-CV-3013 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013). 
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decision in the jurisdiction with the largest television market.61  They 
also fine-tuned their argument, focusing in particular on the live 
streaming aspect of Aereo’s service (as opposed to the record-and-
playback function).62 
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion.63  The user control features of Aereo’s online streaming service, 
it held, are sufficiently similar to make Cablevision dispositive as a mat-
ter of stare decisis.64  The panel explained that, under Cablevision, the 
“to the public” language in the Transmit Clause refers to the potential 
audience for the original transmission and not to the underlying pro-
gram.65  The provision, it explained, cannot be read to include any 
and all transmissions of the same underlying program because such a 
reading could transform even private transmissions into public ones—
say, when a viewer watches the program on another device in her 
house through her home network.66  To allow such a reading, the 
panel explained, would effectively render the “to the public language” 
superfluous.67  The only performance addressed in the provision, it 
explained, is created by the original act of transmission from broad-
caster to the airwaves, not to the subsequent transmissions triggered 
by the user’s request to play a recorded copy of the original transmis-
sion.68  The court reasoned that, as in Cablevision, Aereo enables 
unique users to receive and watch their own transmission of the de-
sired broadcast.69 
The Aereo panel also briefly examined the text and history of the 
Transmit Clause.  Echoing Cablevision, it explained that Congress ex-
plicitly addressed the provision to “the emergence of cable television 
systems” in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s.70  Congress made 
their intentions all the clearer, moreover, when, at the same time, it 
                                                        
 61.  See Brian Stelter, Aereo Wins Court Battle, Dismaying Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/media/aereo-wins-in-appeals-
court-setting-stage-for-trial-on-streaming-broadcast-tv.html?_r=0 (“The broadcasters, sur-
prised and disappointed, said they were confident they would prevail eventually.”). 
 62.  See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history 
makes clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider.  Rather, Aereo, and not just 
its subscribers, ‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s].’)”). 
 63.  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686–87, 696 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 64.  Id. at 695.  
 65.  Id. at 687 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 66.  Id. at 688. 
 67.  Id. at 687–88 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135–36). 
 68.  Id. at 688–89 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138).   
 69.  Id. at 689–90. 
 70.  Id. at 685 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676). 
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created a whole new compulsory licensing regime that would enable 
“cable systems” to retransmit broadcast programming.71  Together, 
the panel explained, the Transmit Clause and Section 111 were to 
moderate the high-stakes contest between broadcasters and cable op-
erators.72  Congress, the panel continued, did no such thing for any 
other video distribution technologies at that time; it did not express 
any sense for how to structure a broad and all-inclusive statutory li-
censing regime that could accommodate “unanticipated technologi-
cal developments” like online video streaming.73  The design of the 
Aereo service could not have been anticipated.74  And this was not a 
small point for the panel: the difference between “public and private 
transmissions” in the 1970s “was simpler than today.”75 
Judge Denny Chin wrote a forceful dissenting opinion.76  He 
agreed that Congress incorporated the public performance right and 
corollary compulsory licensing regime in the 1976 Copyright Act in 
order to address cable retransmission of broadcast signals.77  But, he 
continued, the majority’s decision privileges form over substance as it 
would allow unauthorized retransmissions through “a Rube Goldberg-
like contrivance, over-engineered . . . to avoid the reach of the Copy-
right Act.”78  For him, Cablevision is inapplicable because the RS-DVR 
service in that case supplements the real-time service for which cable 
systems pay statutory licensing fees under Section 111 and retransmis-
sion consent fees under the Communications Act.79 
In any event, Judge Chin continued, Congress explicitly sought 
to incorporate “all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and 
wireless communications media” in their definition of “transmit.”80  
Congress, he argued, had a broad conception of public performance 
                                                        
 71.  Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012)). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 694–95. 
 74.  Id. at 694. 
 75.  Id. at 694–95. 
 76.  Id. at  696 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Id. at 704; cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 
(1974) (holding that cable service that retransmitted broadcast signal outside local area 
was not a public performance within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act); Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (holding that cable operator’s 
retransmission of broadcast signal is not a public performance within the meaning of the 
1909 Copyright Act). 
 78.  Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).  It is worth mentioning here that, in 
Cablevision, the Second Circuit reversed then-District Court Judge Chin’s decision for 
broadcasters.  Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 79.  Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also 47 U.S.C. §325(b)(6) (2012). 
 80.  Aereo, 712 F.3d at 701 (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678). 
  
2015] DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE 731 
that, according to the legislative history, included any transmissions to 
the public, no matter whether individuals can watch and record at dif-
ferent times or in different places.81  While it did not foresee video 
streaming over the Internet, he conceded, Congress surely meant to 
include streaming in their definition of public performance under 
Section 101.82 
The Aereo majority’s short response to the dissent was that, after 
Cablevision, “technical architecture matters.”83  The majority noted the 
plaintiffs’ argument that Aereo in all likelihood designed its system 
with that earlier case in mind—that is, its engineers quite plainly de-
signed around the concerns that the Second Circuit identified in Ca-
blevision.84  But that, the majority continued, was not itself incriminat-
ing; this is not the first time that a company has developed a business 
plan or designed an information sharing technology with an eye to 
existing law.85  Aereo provided just one of many emergent cloud 
computer services that Cablevision had arguably instigated.86  Like 
those other services, the panel suggested, the company merely ena-
bles subscribers to control how they watch broadcast programs.87 
C.  The Supreme Court 
The plaintiffs in the Second Circuit case filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari that the Supreme Court promptly granted early in 2014.88  
The Court heard argument in the case in April and, a couple months 
later, reversed the Second Circuit in a 6–3 decision.89 
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, was not as taken by 
the uniqueness of Aereo’s design as the Second Circuit panel majority 
had been.90  Aereo’s one user, one antenna design, it explained, does 
not make the transmission less “public” for the purposes of the 
                                                        
 81.  Id. at 698–99. 
 82.  Id. at 698. 
 83.  Id. at 694 (majority opinion). 
 84.  Id. at 693–94. 
 85.  Id. at 694. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 692. 
 88.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).  Interestingly, Aereo did 
not object to the petition.   Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., No. 13-461 (Oct. 11, 2013).  Plaintiffs had filed a motion for rehearing with the full 
Second Circuit that the court promptly rejected.  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 
500 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 89.  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
 90.  Id. at 2507–08.  
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Transmit Clause.91  The peculiar “behind-the-scenes way in which 
Aereo delivers television programming to its viewers’ screens” does 
“not render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of 
cable companies.”92  The company’s service, it explained, does not 
“significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers.”93  
The Transmit Clause’s language was not addressed solely to the origi-
nal performance of the underlying work, the majority continued, but 
to every manner in which that underlying work is conveyed to mem-
bers of the public.94  Congress made this clear, the majority explained, 
by asserting in the statute that a public performance occurs “whether 
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . 
receive it . . . at the same time or at different times.”95  In this regard, 
the Court noted, Congress specifically sought to overturn two prior 
Supreme Court opinions in which the Court refused to hold cable 
operators liable for violating the public performance rights of broad-
casters under the old statute.96  In the 1976 statute, the majority con-
tinued, Congress sought to impose liability on operators as well as 
subscribers for performing work—that cable operators were not mere-
ly making equipment available to viewers, but also impermissibly 
transmitting signals to viewers.97 
Accordingly, the Court explained, since Aereo “performs” broad-
cast programs “publicly” in the same way that cable operators do, it is 
bound by the same provisions of the Copyright Act—that is, neither 
Aereo nor any other online video distributors like it may retransmit 
broadcast signals without broadcasters’ authorization.98 
The majority limited the scope of its holding in the face of con-
cerns from amici and others that a decision against Aereo might also 
impose unintended restrictions on cloud computing services general-
ly.99  The distinction between the online video distribution at issue 
and other internet-based services was not hard to make: unlike the lat-
ter, the majority explained, Aereo’s subscribers do not have any pro-
prietary interest in the underlying works that Aereo makes available.100  
                                                        
 91.  Id. at 2501. 
 92.  Id. at 2508. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 2509. 
 95.  Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96.  Id. at 2505–06. 
 97.  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5676). 
 98.  Id. at 2511. 
 99.  Id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 100.  Id. at 2510 (majority opinion). 
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The Transmit Clause “does not extend to those who act as owners or 
possessors of the relevant product”; it could only be addressed to “ca-
ble companies and their equivalents.”101  This means that, at a mini-
mum, the provision covers entities that “communicate[] . . . contem-
poraneously perceptible images and sounds” of a work in the same 
way that cable providers do.102  In any event, the majority observed, 
the fair use doctrine provides a fail-safe mechanism against “inappro-
priate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”103 
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion that Justices Thomas 
and Alito joined.  In it, he rejected the majority’s conclusion that 
Aereo could directly infringe on broadcasters’ performance rights if 
subscribers, not Aereo, trigger the transmission of the underlying 
work.104  The right question, he argued, was instead about the scope 
of secondary liability, not direct liability.105  This is an important dis-
tinction, Justice Scalia explained, because Aereo does not engage in 
volitional conduct.106  Its “automated, user-controlled system,” he con-
tinued, places the decisive volitional conduct in the hands of the sub-
scriber.107  Aereo, for its part, Justice Scalia concluded, does not have 
the requisite amount of intentionality to be directly liable for direct 
infringement.108  He reasoned that it “does not ‘perform’ for the sole 
and simple reason that it does not make the choice of content.”109  
This is far different, he noted, than the cable services that gave rise to 
the Transmit Clause in 1976.110  Those services, Justice Scalia ex-
plained, actively defined the video content they supplied to subscrib-
ers.111 
In the end, Justice Scalia reserved his most caustic criticism for 
the majority’s “guilt by resemblance” approach to copyright law.112  
Among other things, he observed, the House Report to which the ma-
jority only cited once could not be reflective of congressional intent at 
the time.113  In any event, he explained, the majority’s decision to turn 
                                                        
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 2509. 
 103.  Id. at 2511. 
 104.  Id. at 2512–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105.  Id. at 2514. 
 106.  Id. at 2512–13. 
 107.  Id. at 2513. 
 108.  Id. at 2514. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 2515. 
 111.  Id. at 2515–16. 
 112.  Id. at 2515–17. 
 113.  Id. 
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“performance” on a “cable-TV-lookalike rule” does not provide much 
clarity for other online video distribution services.114 
D.  Agency Work (or, What the Aereo Opinions Did Not Mention) 
The authors of the majority and dissenting opinions reached 
their conclusions in the absence of any clear precedent on the ques-
tion of how broadly the public performance right reaches.  Justice 
Breyer thought it was important to identify and make sense of the 
Transmit Clause’s general legislative purpose in the context of the 
new technology.115  He wondered whether Aereo’s service was much 
different from cable, and concluded that it was not.116  It did not mat-
ter that online video streaming was unknown to lawmakers in 1976.  
He just presumed that, under the Copyright Act, users must have an 
underlying relationship with the work in question in order to avoid 
liability under the Transmit Clause, although no court has ever re-
quired as much. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, on the other hand, was characteristically 
dismissive of the use of legislative history as a methodology for inter-
preting the meaning of the Transmit Clause.117  He determined that 
the semantic meaning of the operative verb in the Transmit Clause—
“perform”—required a volitional act on the part of the alleged in-
fringer even though, not unlike the majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court has never adverted as much.118 
In this regard, the Breyer and Scalia opinions in Aereo were just 
the latest installments in the longstanding feud between the two 
about judicial interpretive approach.  They were both unwaveringly 
confident in their authority to make legal sense of the new technology 
                                                        
 114.  Id. at 2516.  Justice Scalia posited that the “cable-TV-lookalike rule” as such would 
not resolve whether a record-and-playback service like that offered by Aereo (but not on 
review on appeal) infringes on broadcasters’ public performance right.  Id. at 2516–17.  
Under current law, however, that sort of “time shifting” would likely be a permissible fair 
use.  The majority seemed to agree as much with this point.  Accord id. at 2511 (majority 
opinion) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 115.  Id. at 2502–10. 
 116.  Id. at 2507.  Courts have often felt compelled to make analogies to conventional 
communications technologies in order to make legal sense of the internet.  This has the 
unfortunate effect of underappreciating the novel particularities of the specific online ser-
vice or application at issue. 
 117.  Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(referring to “the severe shortcomings” of reli-
ance on legislative history as an “interpretive methodology”). 
 118.  But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. 
Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there 
should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s 
system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”). 
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without consultation of anything more than the statute and their own 
interpretive methodology.119 
This preoccupation was put in full relief in the Aereo case because 
federal agencies—that is, important institutional interpreters of pub-
lic law other than courts—have over the past decade or so sought to 
clarify how to treat online video distributors under the Copyright Act 
or the Communications Act.  The Copyright Office, as I explain in 
more detail in Part III below, has for over the past decade repeatedly 
observed that online video distributors are not “cable systems” within 
the meaning of Section 111 of the Copyright Act, the sister provision 
of the Transmit Clause.  Those agency decisions clearly are at odds or 
at least inconsistent with the majority’s decision in Aereo.  The FCC for 
its part has been administering a proceeding on whether online video 
distributors owe the same duties to broadcasters that cable operators 
and other multichannel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”) 
do.  As with their silence on the Copyright Office’s implementation of 
Section 111, the Justices’ omission of these proceedings borders on 
remarkable.  The Justices’ silence on the role that these agencies have 
been playing since the advent of the online video distribution is all 
the more notable in light of the fact that both Justices Breyer and 
Scalia are former scholars and teachers of administrative law. 
To put the matter more starkly: neither Aereo opinion gave any 
consideration to whether the courts are the right or best institutions 
for deciding how to treat online video streaming in the face of so 
much agency work on the matter.  The Justices took for granted that 
they are.  And, as it goes, they were not alone.  None of the other trial 
or appellate courts to hear the cases against Aereo or FilmOn before 
the Supreme Court’s decision last summer gave any meaningful con-
sideration (never mind deference) to agency actions on the matter.120 
                                                        
 119.  See supra Part I.C.  
 120.  See supra Part I.B.  After the Supreme Court decision, Aereo sought to amend its 
pleadings to allege that it qualified for a compulsory license under Section 111.  Joint Let-
ter of Parties at 3 (July 9, 2014) (No. 12-cv-1540), available at 
http://blog.aereo.com/2014/07/3784/.  In the litigation that led to the Supreme Court 
decision, Aereo had argued that it could not qualify as a cable system.  The company 
thought it could invoke the provision as an affirmative defense to broadcasters’ motion for 
an injunction, particularly after the Supreme Court held that Aereo is like a cable system 
for the purposes of the Transmit Clause.  It argued that, if they are a cable system under 
the Copyright Act, they are entitled to the benefits of the statutory license under 111(c).  It 
accordingly filed statements of account and royalty fees with the Copyright Office.  The 
agency promptly rejected the request.  “[I]nternet retransmissions of broadcast television,” 
it explained, “fall outside the scope of the Section 111 license.”  Letter from General 
Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, United States 
Copyright Office, to Matthew Calabro, Aereo, Inc. (July 16, 2014), available at 
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_lette
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My argument here is that courts should, as a matter of course, at-
tend to the agencies that Congress set in motion in the Copyright Act 
and the Communications Act.  Courts and information law scholars 
have attended to the relative institutional roles that legislatures, agen-
cies, and courts play in resolving disputes arising from disruptive net-
worked communications technologies in a variety of other substantive 
legislative fields.121  No one, however, has done so for the public per-
formance right.  To the extent legal commentators have written about 
the online video streaming cases, they focus on what the right sub-
stantive policy ought to be; they ask whether courts have struck the 
proper balance between content owners, innovators, and the pub-
lic.122 
That this has been the narrow focus of scholarship is no surprise.  
The preoccupation with finding the best positive substantive outcome 
(irrespective of legal process and governance) is the staple of infor-
mation law scholarship.  The most enduring law review article in the 
area argued that policymakers ought to promulgate more than statu-
tory prohibitions because today’s software writers and computer engi-
neers are demonstrably too wily to be daunted by them.123  Legislators 
and policymakers, this scholar argued, ought to implement “soft” 
forms of regulation that foster innovation.124 
                                                        
r.pdf.  The company filed for bankruptcy soon afterward.  Tanya Agrawal & Jonathan 
Stempel, Video streaming service Aereo files for bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-aereo-bankruptcy-
idUSKCN0J513K20141121.  In spite of this filing, broadcasters continue to prosecute their 
substantive infringement claim.  See Broadcasters’ Motion for Relief from Stay Pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and Memorandum of Law, In re Aereo, Inc., Case No. 14-13200 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), available at 
http://ia601409.us.archive.org/12/items/gov.uscourts.nysb.254268/gov.uscourts.nysb.254
268.47.0.pdf.   
 121.  See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 9; Fetzer & Yoo, supra note 9; Freiwald, 
supra note 9; Kerr, supra note 9; Mazzone, supra note 9; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra 
note 9; Solove, supra note 9.   
 122.  See, e.g., Novak, supra note 8; Rasenberger & Pepe, supra note 8, at, 641–43. 
 123.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 513–14 (1999); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formula-
tion of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998) 
(“[L]aw and government regulation are not the only source of rulemaking.  Technological 
capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants.  The creation and im-
plementation of information policy are embedded in network designs and standards as 
well as in system configurations.”). 
 124.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 175 (2006) (“Code can, and increasingly will, displace 
law as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace.  Private fences, not pub-
lic law.”); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 184 (1999); 
Joel R. Reidenberg, supra note 123, at 554–55. 
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But, today, over three decades since its commercialization, the 
Internet is far more than an innovation machine that policymakers 
must regulate delicately.125  Today, as is quite evident in the growth of 
the market for online video, the Internet is now fully integrated into 
public life.  At least for now, the transmission protocol on which the 
Internet is based is the dominant means of distributing infor-
mation.126  Parties are now more than ever asking courts to resolve 
high-stakes communication technology disputes in a variety of settings 
presumably because there is no obvious answer to what the proper 
policy balance ought to be.127 
The overwhelming focus on substantive policy outcomes ignores 
the far more pertinent question today of how courts ought to make 
legal sense of laws when technologies change and prevailing public 
law objectives are in tension.  These are difficult questions to answer.  
They are all the trickier for judges when sophisticated and well-
resourced public interest groups, trade associations, and transnational 
conglomerates bring to bear their own interests to the question. 
Congress delegated first-instance policymaking authority to the 
Copyright Office and the FCC precisely for these reasons.  And this is 
also why courts have deferred to those agencies (under Chevron, for 
example).128  But this is why the Aereo opinions are so remarkable; the 
Justices evinced no awareness of this background. 
The Aereo case accordingly provides an opportunity to consider 
the ways in which courts might develop a more careful approach to 
making legal sense of disruptive technologies when statutes are am-
biguous.  I outline in Part III what such an approach would look like.  
In short, I argue that courts ought to determine at the outset, before 
deciding the substantive question, whether the agencies that Congress 
has charged with filling in gaps in video distribution law have ad-
dressed or are in the process of addressing the matter.129  Before set-
                                                        
 125.  Cf. Sylvain, supra note 10. 
 126.  See, e.g., Order, Technology Transitions, 29 FCC Rcd. 1433 (2014) (ordering ex-
perimentation for the transition from traditional time-division multiplexed circuit-
switched voice services to an Internet protocol based voice service). 
 127.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Viacom Int’l v. Youtube, 
Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 128.  City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, , 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (applying Chevron defer-
ence to the FCC’s rulemaking on cellphone tower siting provision in the Communications 
Act); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279-85 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Chevron and 
Skidmore deference to Copyright Office’s findings regarding §111 of the Copyright Act).  
See generally GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.20, n.7 (3d Edition 2005) (observing that, while 
“[c]ircuits divide on the deference to be given to the Copyright Office[,] . . . some courts 
give so-called ‘Chevron deference’”). 
 129.  See infra Part III.C. 
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ting out the contours of this proposal, however, I show in Part II be-
low that the Copyright Office and the FCC have, indeed, been very ac-
tive in the legislative field of video distribution for decades. 
II.  VIDEO DISTRIBUTION LAW IN FOCUS 
Contemporary legal disputes involving novel communications 
technologies generally arise from disagreements between individual 
users, entrepreneurs, and engineers over the meaning or scope of ex-
isting public law.  It is no surprise that new technologies could trigger 
such heated, high-stakes disagreement.  The original language and 
purpose of laws concerning networked communications were not de-
signed to address modern-day realities. 
Courts employ different interpretive strategies to resolve such 
disputes depending on the nature of the particular statutory provision 
at issue and in consideration of the applicable institutional con-
straints.  On the one hand, they might take it upon themselves to re-
solve a matter in the first instance without consulting anyone else.  
Or, on the other hand, they might consult or defer to other institu-
tions (i.e., administrative agencies) on the assumption that the latter 
are better suited to resolving such disputes in the first instance than 
courts are. 
But, in Aereo, the Supreme Court did not evince any awareness 
that they had a choice in the matter.  Neither the majority nor the 
dissent gave a moment’s consideration to whether it (or any federal 
courts) should defer to or even consider the work of the Copyright 
Office or the Federal Communications Commission on video distribu-
tion law.130  They presumably believed that it was their responsibility 
to resolve the contest between broadcasters and the developers of 
online video distribution applications, in spite of the regulatory re-
gimes that Congress created solely for that purpose.  To give some 
context for this glaringly immodest view of their relative institutional 
role, here, in this Part, I outline the public law that they ignored. 
A.  The History and Political Economy of Video Distribution 
Broadcast radio and television have played an important role in 
defining American public life for several decades now.  But Congress 
enshrined the political economy of broadcast distribution in the Ra-
dio Act of 1927, and then the Communications Act of 1934.131  In 
both, broadcasters were to be the vital trustees of the public airwaves.  
                                                        
 130.  See supra Part I.C. 
 131.  See Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162; Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064. 
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A station could only obtain a license to use a frequency in the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum if it could demonstrate to the FCC (and the 
Federal Radio Commission before it) that it would act in the public 
interest.132 
This regulatory arrangement was the backdrop for the advertis-
ing-based broadcast network system of the twentieth century.  The 
major broadcast networks entered into exclusive agreements with lo-
cal station affiliates across the country to distribute original pro-
gramming.  The networks and their affiliates supported this system by 
selling time during the airing of their programs to advertisers.  Audi-
ence size translated into revenue; the bigger and more captive the 
audience, the greater the revenue to broadcasters. 
The popularity of programming was therefore essential to the 
flow of revenue.  The major studios did everything they could to keep 
audiences coming back for more.  Daytime programming was im-
portant, of course.  But, in this scheme, the most lucrative airtime was 
(and, for broadcasters, still is) in the evening: primetime, after people 
had come home from work and eaten dinner. 
American viewers generally abided by this schedule, organizing 
their waking lives around weekly listings in TV Guide and the local 
newspaper.  Television was the great electronic hearth by which view-
ers, together, enthusiastically basked in a shared American culture.  
Anchormen like Walter Cronkite supplied reassurance during diffi-
cult times.  Popular episodic comedies like The Honeymooners and I 
Love Lucy made fun and sense of the times.  The American public ex-
perienced primetime television in one sitting as a single community.  
Of course, there were minorities, outliers, and dissenters who did not 
follow mainstream television programming.133  For the most part, 
however, broadcast television was an important galvanizing force in 
American life.134 
The Internet and online video in particular have dramatically re-
defined the way in which viewers interact and watch video program-
ming.135  Of course, broadcast television programming continues to 
play an important part in American popular culture today.  Just ask 
the contestants on Dancing with the Stars or any one of the Real House-
wives.  But it does not occupy the defining position in the culture that 
                                                        
 132.  See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
 133.  Olivier Sylvain, Contingency and the “Networked Information Economy”: A Critique of 
The Wealth of Networks, 4 INT’L J. TECH., KNOWLEDGE & SOC’Y 203 (2008). 
 134.  Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1982). 
 135.  See Tim Wu, Netflix’s War on Mass Culture, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115687/netflixs-war-mass-culture. 
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it once did.  The key difference is that viewers more than ever watch 
video content on their laptops and mobile phones at the time of their 
choosing.136  At a minimum, the attraction of live or prime time televi-
sion as such is not as salient to young adult viewers.137 
To be clear, online streaming of broadcast programming has ex-
isted for only a little more than a decade.138  It still comprises a small 
fraction of TV viewing today.139  But so much more seems to be at 
stake today, as the number of online video viewers will continue to in-
crease in the coming years.140 
The popularity of online video content has grown so much over 
just the past decade or so that it is now cutting into markets long 
dominated by broadcasters.  Companies like Hulu, Amazon, and Net-
flix have for the past seven or so years supplied internet-enabled plat-
forms for streaming episodic shows and feature films.  In the past two 
years, they have developed their own critically acclaimed original epi-
sodic programs like House of Cards and Orange is the New Black and fea-
ture films like Mitt.141  And, of course, YouTube and Vimeo provide 
internet-based platforms for user-generated video content.  Cable 
programmers like HBO, too, are now getting in the game, promising 
to deliver their premium content to online streamers who do not sub-
scribe to cable.142 
Online streaming of broadcast programming poses one of the 
biggest threats to the traditional political economy of video produc-
tion and distribution.  It is no wonder that Nielsen, the audience 
                                                        
 136.  See generally Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4406–09 (2009) (discussing Slingbox 
and other technological innovations). 
 137.  NIELSEN COMPANY & THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE, OUT OF HOME 
TELEVISION AND OTHER VIDEO VIEWING BEHAVIORS OF U.S. ADULTS: RESULTS FROM THE 
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE VIDEO CONSUMER MAPPING STUDY (2010). 
 138.  See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (finding for broadcasters in suit challenging web-based transmis-
sion of U.S. over-the-air programs to viewers in the United States via a Canadian website). 
 139.  Alex Kantrowitz, Are Advertisers Spending Too Much on Online Video?, ADVERTISING 
AGE (Sept. 11, 2013), http://adage.com/article/digital/nielsen-online-video-
consumption-tiny-compared-tv/244084/. 
 140.  Associated Press, Cord Cutting a Trend? Nielsen to Begin Counting Online Streaming, 
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cord-cutting-a-trend-nielsen-
to-begin-counting-online-streaming/. 
 141.  Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are ill-
suited to a marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”). 
 142.  Issie Lapowsky, Down with Cable! Why HBO Is Finally Launching a Standalone Stream-
ing Service, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/hbo-streaming-
service/?mbid=social_twitter. 
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measurement firm, now includes mobile devices in its analysis of TV 
audiences.143  News, moreover, that Comcast, the cable television gi-
ant, entered a special “peering” arrangement with Netflix earlier this 
year to manage the latter’s high bandwidth traffic to users portends 
quite a fundamental restructuring of the video distribution market.144 
Broadcasters today are eager to find, and jealously guard, viewers 
where they can.  And they are invoking all of the legal protections 
available to them to ward off emergent networked communications 
companies.145 
What are courts to do now that the traditional model for distrib-
uting premium video is being inverted by a technology that enables 
individual users to control where, when, and on what device they 
watch content?  The courts to which the question was posed in the 
cases involving Aereo and FilmOn were divided about the scope of 
the public performance right and its application to these new forms 
of video distribution—that is, until the Supreme Court decided the 
matter this past summer.  Their uncertainty was no surprise.  On the 
one hand, the language in the Transmit Clause recognizes that 
transmissions that are delivered to different places at different times 
could still be performed publicly within the meaning of the statute.  
But the law was also conceived at a time when video distribution was 
mostly comprised of simultaneous transmissions of live and episodic 
network programs.  They were public in the colloquial sense; broad-
cast television articulated shared cultural and political priorities that 
were experienced contemporaneously by all viewers.  Today, online 
video subscribers trigger the “performance” of broadcast programs 
                                                        
 143.  Todd Spangler, Nielsen to Add Mobile Device Viewing to TV Ratings in Fall 2014, 
VARIETY (Sept. 19, 2013), http://variety.com/2013/tv/news/nielsen-to-add-mobile-device-
viewing-to-tv-ratings-in-fall-2014-1200649185/. 
 144.  Steven Musil, Netflix Reaches Streaming Traffic Agreement with Comcast, CNET (Feb. 
23, 2014), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57619353-93/netflix-reaches-streaming-
traffic-agreement-with-comcast/.  This announcement came on the heels of other news 
that, pending regulatory approval, Comcast, the largest cable operator in the country, will 
acquire Time Warner Cable, the second largest cable operator in the country.  Michael 
Santoli, Comcast and Time Warner Cable Merger: What It Means for Consumers, YAHOO! FINANCE 
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/comcast-to-acquire-time-
warner-cable-143000745.html.  
 145.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding for broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the 
public performance of copyrighted programming framed with advertisements obtained by 
defendants from Toronto to computer users in the United States); see also WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, 
Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that an internet-based video streaming site is 
not a “cable system” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 111, the compulsory licensing pro-
visions of the Copyright Act).  I use the term “emergent” or “novel” networked communi-
cations throughout to denote the category of technologies that, while extant and available 
to users, have not yet been the subject of legal analysis or interpretation by courts. 
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with a click or tap of their networked device.  In light of the great va-
riety of video programming now available, it makes little sense to refer 
to the public in the same sense as broadcast law posits, at least be-
cause “performances” are experienced in a far more fractured and 
diffuse way than they were just a generation ago. 
B.  Agencies and the Public Law of Video Distribution Today 
The Copyright Act and the Transmit Clause memorialized a 
hard-fought, decades-long legislative settlement concerning powerful 
interests in the market for video distribution.  Congress enacted the 
public performance right under Section 106 and the corollary com-
pulsory licensing regime in order to settle the conflict between 
broadcasters and cable operators.  In the four decades since, Con-
gress has incrementally reformed this regime to account for new vid-
eo distribution technologies as they have emerged.146 
But the Copyright Act does not comprehensively cover the field.  
Congress also has amended the Communications Act consistently 
since its enactment in 1934 to define the legal obligations and enti-
tlements of the variety of extant stakeholders in the field of broadcast 
and video distribution.  Congress, for example, substantially revised 
the law governing the retransmission of broadcast programming in 
1992 in two ways.  First, Congress required cable and direct broadcast 
satellite service (“DBS”) providers to carry certain broadcast pro-
gramming.  Second, Congress created for broadcasters a new statutory 
right to veto cable operators’ unauthorized retransmission of broad-
cast content.147  These two provisions—must-carry and retransmission 
consent—were to work in tandem to improve broadcasters’ market 
position vis-à-vis cable operators.  These changes to the Communica-
tions Act adopted the approach that the FCC had employed for dec-
ades before.  Congress, moreover, was explicitly mindful that these re-
forms to the Communications Act would interact with the public 
performance right and the compulsory license regime in the Copy-
right Act.148 
                                                        
 146.  See, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (Title I of the Intellectu-
al Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), 47 U.S.C. §§ 335–338 
(2012). 
 147.  Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460; see iCraveTV, 2000 WL 255989 (holding for 
broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the public performance of copyrighted 
programming framed with advertisements obtained by defendants from Toronto to com-
puter users in the United States). 
 148.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1) (explicitly referring to 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)). 
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In this vein, the 1992 Communications Act amendments fill out a 
legislative field of which the public performance right is just one very 
small piece.  I show here that the combined history of the public per-
formance right, the compulsory licensing regime, must-carry regula-
tion, retransmission consent, as well as program access paints the pic-
ture of a legal field that is determined above all by legislation and 
regulation rather than judge-made law.  At every critical juncture in 
the evolution of the market for video distribution, Congress, the Cop-
yright Office, and the FCC have been the decisive policymaking bod-
ies, filling in gaps and ambiguities of the governing statutes when 
novel technologies emerge and the general market circumstances 
change over time.  This Part sets up my argument in Part III that 
courts are misguided when they take it upon themselves to elaborate 
any single feature of this regime with barely a whisper about this regu-
latory context. 
1.  The Copyright Act 
a.  Public Performance and the Statutory License 
Before 1976, cable operators did not seek the permission of local 
stations to retransmit broadcast programming.  Broadcasters were 
perfectly content with this arrangement.  They did not really see cable 
service as a threat.  To the contrary, they believed that cable operators 
could, at best, marginally expand viewership.149  They understood ca-
ble television to be more charity than market disruption. 
At least in its early years, it arguably was.  The cooperatives and 
early operators of what was then called “community antenna televi-
sion” retransmitted broadcast signals to members and potential view-
ers who, for a variety of reasons, could not otherwise receive clear sig-
nals.150  Their main objective was not to compete with broadcasters.  
They used large antennas as well as signaling and amplification tech-
nologies to receive over-the-air broadcast signals that they would oth-
erwise not be able to get.151  Operatives retransmitted those signals by 
cable (or microwave) to interested neighbors’ televisions.152 
                                                        
 149.  See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION 
OR COMPETITION 2 (1996).  During this period, moreover, the FCC chose not to regulate 
cable retransmission.  See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV 
Translators, TV “Satellite” Stations, and TV “Repeaters” on the Orderly Development of 
Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403, 431 (1959) (“[W]e find no present basis for assert-
ing jurisdiction or authority over CATV’s . . . .”). 
 150.  Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968).   
 151.  See generally Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 827 (2012). 
 152.  Id. 
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It was only as cable service became more popular in the 1960s 
that broadcasters grew concerned.153  Under the advertising-based 
network-affiliate model of broadcast programming distribution, local 
stations paid for network content on the condition that they would be 
the exclusive purveyors of the content in that given local market.154  
Local stations could count on monetizing local advertisers’ interest in 
reaching local audiences.  While they welcomed national advertising, 
each station cultivated an exclusive relationship with a major broad-
cast network in order to attract local advertisers.155  Since local adver-
tisers had no real interest in reaching distant markets, a station’s deci-
sion to enter into an exclusive agreement with a major network was a 
simple exercise in arithmetic. 
Cable television unsettled this arrangement.  A local cable opera-
tor reduced broadcasters’ ability to measure the size of their respec-
tive local audience for their programming.156  This was a clear threat 
for a business model that depended as heavily as it did (and still does) 
on the ability to measure and collect data about audiences. 
By the sixties, cable television matured into a line of business for 
which viewers were showing a willingness to pay a fee.  By the 1970s, 
cable operators also began to develop their own programs and, as a 
result, disrupted the whole political economy of broadcast distribu-
tion.157 
Broadcasters in particular grew concerned that cable operators 
were monetizing their original programming without permission or 
compensation.  They accordingly brought suits against cable opera-
tors, alleging that they were, among other things, infringing on their 
exclusive right to “perform” dramatic works publicly for profit under 
the 1909 Copyright Act.158 
The Supreme Court rejected broadcasters’ claims in two opin-
ions by Justice Potter Stewart.  In Fortnightly v. United Artists159 in 1968 
and Teleprompter v. Columbia Broadcasting System160 in 1974, the Court 
held that community access television did not infringe on broadcast-
                                                        
 153.  See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d. 348 (9th Cir. 1964). 
 154.  ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1933–1953 (1968). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  MARY ALICE & MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA 
TELEVISION 42 (1972); MARTIN H. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY 
ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 44 (1965). 
 157.  See Sylvain, supra note 151 at 827–28. 
 158.  See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968). 
 159.  392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
 160.  415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
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ers’ public performance rights under the 1909 Copyright Act.161  Re-
transmission by cable, the Court concluded in Fortnightly, was not a 
public performance within the meaning of the 1909 law because “the 
basic function” of the amplification technologies at issue is not unlike 
anything that the ordinary broadcast television viewer can do to re-
ceive a signal on her own.162  CATV cooperatives and commercial op-
erators in this sense are “passive beneficiar[ies]” of broadcasters’ per-
formances; they are not the purveyors of programming as such.163 
The Court in Teleprompter applied this holding to cable operators 
that imported distant (that is, not local) broadcast signals into local 
markets, interconnected with other area CATV systems, originated 
their own video content, and sold advertising.164  Those operators, it 
explained, also do not perform within the meaning of the 1909 Copy-
right Act.165  First, the Court reasoned, it made no difference under 
the 1909 Act that cable operators had become entrepreneurial if 
there was still no “nexus” between these new features and the broad-
cast content that they retransmitted.166  Second, the Court rejected 
the argument that cable operators transformed into performers with-
in the meaning of the 1909 law when they began importing distant 
signals into local areas that would otherwise not receive them. This 
importation function, the Court explained, does not change the na-
ture of cable service because, as in systems that retransmit local signals 
to local audiences, it remains a wholly “viewer function.”167  Broad-
casters, it explained, send their programs out to the public to be re-
ceived and watched.  Cable operators simply make that content avail-
able to viewers.168  The Court was also not particularly taken by the 
argument that cable television upsets the political economy of the ad-
vertising-based system of broadcasting.  Cable operators, Justice Stew-
art observed, only expand broadcasters’ potential viewer market, and 
only really affect their relationship with advertisers.169 
Having failed in the courts, broadcasters appealed to Congress.170  
There, they found a more hospitable forum.  This is not to say that 
                                                        
 161.  Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–02; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405. 
 162.  Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399. 
 163.  Id. at 398–99. 
 164.  Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408. 
 165.  Id. at 410–12. 
 166.  Id. at 405. 
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 169.  Id. at 411–13. 
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Congress obliged their every request; it did not.  Rather, the legisla-
tive process, more than litigation, was far more conducive to resolving 
the variety of policy concerns—concerns involving competition, the 
distribution of free programming, and the protection of local broad-
casters. 
Legislators, moreover, were already inclined to reform the exist-
ing copyright law.  Indeed, by the 1950s, legislators already were con-
sidering ways to update the 1909 Act.171  By the 1960s, many of the re-
forms that would appear in the 1976 statute had already been 
“hammered out.”172  Indeed, as early as 1966, members of the House 
were circulating a version of a provision that resembles the enacted 
provision we now call the Transmit Clause.173  The report that accom-
panied the provision at this early stage observed, moreover, that the 
provision was addressed to transmissions that are “capable of reaching 
different recipients at different times, as in the case of sounds or im-
ages stored in an information system and capable of being performed 
or displayed at the initiative of individual members of the public.”174  
The report made this observation to explain the last clauses of the 
Transmit Clause addressed to time and place.175 
The steady emergence of cable television and the Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter litigation complicated this legislative work.  In those cases, 
the Court gave cable operators more leverage than they had before 
the opinions were announced.  This is what the 1976 Act sought to re-
solve.  As I explained above, in the Transmit Clause, Congress explic-
itly overturned the holdings in these Supreme Court cases.176 
                                                        
the 1960s led the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and networks to lobby Con-
gress, the FCC, and the public to protect ‘free television’ from cable’s potential threat.”). 
 171.  See Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute 
in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 31 (2011) (“Congress set out to update 
the 1909 Copyright Act at various points during the first half of the twentieth century 
without success.”). 
 172.  Id. at 32. 
 173.  Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 57–58 (1966) (defining “transmit” and “public” 
under proposed Copyright Act revisions), with 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (defining “pub-
licly” in the Transmit Clause). 
 174.  H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 58. 
 175.  Id.  The congressional report’s description appears to describe the Aereo design.  
See supra Part I.A.  But, to be clear, it does not address individuated recording applications 
like Aereo’s or FilmOn’s.  At most, the report raises questions about the Second Circuit’s 
analysis of the Transmit Clause in the Cablevision case, where the defendant cable operator 
stored broadcast content in its single “information system” and retransmitted those signals 
“at the initiative of individual members of the public.”  Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-83 at 29 (1967)).  
 176.  See supra text accompanying notes 94–98. 
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Importantly, Congress also set out a compulsory licensing scheme 
through which “cable systems” would have to pay a statutorily defined 
fee under Section 111.177  That provision provides that: 
secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a 
performance or display of a work embodied in a primary 
transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the 
Federal Communications Commission . . . shall be subject to 
statutory licensing upon compliance with the requirements 
of subsection (d) where the carriage of the signals compris-
ing the secondary transmission is permissible under the 
rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission.178 
Section 111 defines a cable system in pertinent part as “a facility” that 
“receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more 
television broadcast stations licensed by the [FCC], and makes sec-
ondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, mi-
crowave, or other communications channels to subscribing members 
of the public who pay for such service.”179  This legislative arrange-
ment allowed cable operators to continue to retransmit without hav-
ing to concern themselves with the “transaction costs associated with 
marketplace negotiations for the carriage of copyrighted pro-
grams.”180  Under this scheme, however, cable operators would have 
to pay broadcasters in order to retransmit their programming to cable 
subscribers.181 
Congress settled on these terms with the specific political econ-
omy of cable retransmission of broadcasting programming in mind.  
There was nothing inevitable or objectively optimal about the balance 
that it struck.  The impetus for legislative intervention was simply that 
cable service had become a viable player in the broadcast television 
                                                        
 177.  17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining public performance: to wit, “to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any de-
vice or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance 
or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at dif-
ferent times”); Id. § 111 (creating compulsory licensing regime for retransmission of 
broadcast programming by a cable system). 
 178.  Id. § 111(c)(1). 
 179.  Id. § 111(f)(3). 
 180.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 3. 
 181.  See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d).  Some broadcasters today would like to see the compulsory 
licensing regime discontinued.  See JOHN BERGMAYER, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE 
COMPULSORY COPYRIGHT LICENSES 1, 4 (2011), 
http://siliconflatirons.com/documents/publications/report/CompulsoryCopyrightLicens
es.pdf. 
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market.  Congress set out “[l]imitations on exclusive rights” to re-
transmit “broadcast programming by cable.”182 
One can go further and conclude, as the Second Circuit did in 
Aereo, that when Congress drafted the Transmit Clause, it did not in-
tend to confer a sweeping protection to content creators for all time.  
Rather, legislators redressed the controversy known to them at the 
time, explicitly settling on “a series of detailed and complex provi-
sions which attempt to resolve the question of the copyright liability 
of cable television systems.”183  There was “no simple answer to the ca-
ble-copyright controversy,” the House Report on the bill explained.184  
Congress was simply doing the best it could to find a balanced ap-
proach to the existing market for video programming.  In this way, 
Congress moderated the specific extant interests.  Had it sought to 
account for any possible iteration of video distribution, it could have 
said so.185 
b.  The Copyright Office 
But Congress did more than define the relative entitlements and 
duties of broadcasters and cable operators.  Under Section 111, it also 
delegated to the Copyright Office the responsibility of administering 
the licensing regime and,186 as I show here, refining the balance of in-
terests as communications technologies change and new technologies 
emerge. 
The statute prescribes the conditions under which cable provid-
ers may obtain a compulsory license to retransmit copyright works.  
The agency’s role is, on the one hand, quite mundane: it must elabo-
rate the form and content of filings by providers for the purposes of 
administering compulsory licensing filings and facilitating pay-
ments.187  This authority is not unlike the role the agency plays in the 
administration of licensing for the distribution of phonorecords of 
nondramatic musical works as well as the distribution of digital audio 
under Section 114.188 
                                                        
 182.  17 U.S.C. § 111 (describing title of section). 
 183.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Compare id., with Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(5), 72 
Stat. 731, 737 (defining “aircraft” broadly to include “any contrivance now known or hereaf-
ter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in the air”) (emphasis added). 
 186.  17 U.S.C. § 111(d). 
 187.  See 37 C.F.R. § 201.17 (2000). 
 188.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2 )& (f).   
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The agency’s authority, however, extends far beyond the simple 
ministerial implementation of licensing regimes.  Consider the Regis-
ter of Copyright’s responsibility to advise Congress and agencies dur-
ing the consideration of amendments or in light of new developments 
in the market.189  In this capacity, the agency has been integral to 
Congress’s enactment of copyright-related legislation for decades, in-
cluding the period before the 1976 Act and before passage of the Dig-
ital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998 (“DMCA”).190  Courts, moreo-
ver, are required to seek out the expertise of the Copyright Office in 
cases in which the accuracy of information in a copyright registration 
statement is contested.191 
The Copyright Office also plays the important role of defining 
positive entitlements and duties as changes in communications tech-
nologies render the statutory language more ambiguous over time.  
They take such action through interpretive and legislative rule-
makings.  And courts routinely defer to the agency’s interpretation of 
provisions of the Copyright Act at times of dramatic technological 
change.192  They have reasoned that Congress intended the Copyright 
Office to be the “administrative overseer” of the licensing regime un-
der Section 111 in particular because of the characteristic dynamism 
of the market for communications technologies at issue in that stat-
ute.193  No other entity in the federal government is more equipped to 
measure disruptive communication technologies against the terms of 
the Copyright Act than the Copyright Office. 
Importantly, courts, too, have recognized as much.  In 2012, a 
year before it issued its opinion in the Aereo case, the Second Circuit 
heard an appeal in which ivi, a company that provided web-based vid-
eo streaming to users, sought a declaratory judgment that it is a “cable 
                                                        
 189.  See id. § 701(b)(1)–(2). 
 190.  See, e.g., 144 Cong. REC. 24468 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Patrick Leahy 
referring to the “recommendations and hard work of the Copyright Office” in developing 
the DMCA). 
 191.  See 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) (“In any case in which inaccurate information . . . is al-
leged, the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the 
inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse 
registration.”). 
 192.  See Cablevision v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 609 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1956)). 
 193.  Id. at 608; cf. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 771–72 (E.D. Pa. 
2001) (deferring to the Copyright Office’s interpretation of exemption under Section 114 
pursuant to Chevron; explaining that “the Copyright Office could not exercise its duties 
and functions without the ability to interpret” the applicable statutory language in the con-
text of new and evolving technologies).  See generally 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
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system” within the meaning of Section 111.194  With that designation, 
ivi would be entitled to retransmit broadcast signals as long as it pays 
the statutory fee for the benefit.195  The Second Circuit rejected the 
claim, agreeing with broadcasters that the compulsory licensing provi-
sion under Section 111 does not “extend to Internet transmissions.”196 
The panel also turned to the Copyright Office’s conclusions on 
the matter to get a better sense of “Congress’s intent.”197  It did so 
even though the agency was not a party to the litigation.  Rather, the 
Copyright Office had published reports to Congress in which it re-
peatedly concluded that Internet transmissions do not count as a “ca-
ble system” within the meaning of the compulsory licensing regime 
under Section 111.198  Indeed, in reports and testimony to Congress 
from late 1997 to 2011, the agency had determined consistently that 
internet streaming is not sufficiently like cable television service to be 
subject to the compulsory licensing provision.199  Citing Chevron, the 
Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Office’s assessment.200  The 
agency’s conclusion, the panel held, was reasonable and not other-
wise barred by the statute.201  I will return to this case in Part III below. 
2.  The Communications Act 
The Copyright Act is not the only statute through which Con-
gress legislates in the field of video distribution.  When it amended 
the Communications Act in 1992, Congress set out an even more 
elaborate regime.  Among other things, through that statute, Con-
gress has tasked the FCC with administering a system for awarding li-
censes to broadcasters and rules that govern the markets for video dis-
tribution and programming. 
With this authority, the FCC has had a major, if not decisive, role 
in making legal sense of novel video distribution technologies that 
were not known to lawmakers in 1934, when Congress first enacted 
the statute.  For example, as cable television emerged in valley towns 
across the country in the late 1940s and 1950s,202 the agency relied on 
                                                        
 194.  WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277–79 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 195.  See id. at 278–79. 
 196.  Id. at 282. 
 197.  Id. at 282–83. 
 198.  Id. at 283 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 188; U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION AND LOCALISM ACT § 302 REPORT 48 (2011)). 
 199.  Id. (citing, inter alia, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT 
LICENSING REGIMES COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 97 (1997)).  
 200.  Id. at 284–85. 
 201.  Id. at 284.  
 202.  Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827. 
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the Communications Act to bar cable providers from importing dis-
tant broadcast signals into local markets.203  Congress ratified the 
FCC’s general regulatory approach in 1992 amendments to the 
Communications Act.204  It did so fully mindful of the public perfor-
mance right and the statutory licensing regime in the Copyright Act; 
it observed that the new provisions modify neither “the compulsory 
copyright license established in section 111” nor “existing or future 
video programming licensing agreements between broadcasting sta-
tions and video programmers.”205  The 1992 statutory amendments re-
formed the 1976 Act specifically to redress the remarkable shift in 
market definition caused by the real explosion of cable television in 
the 1980s. 
Today, the Communications Act and the FCC’s implementation 
of it embody the greater part of video distribution law.  The FCC, 
however, has yet to speak definitively about how provisions of the 
Communications Act apply to internet-based video distribution in the 
way the Copyright Office has.206  In this subpart, however, I detail the 
steps the FCC has taken in this regard to underscore the extensive 
scope of existing public law in this area.  I argue that courts should 
routinely incorporate, or at least acknowledge in their analyses of the 
current generation of video streaming cases, this expansive regulatory 
arrangement. 
a.  Retransmission Consent and Must-Carry 
From the late-1940s to the mid-1960s, the FCC chose to impose a 
regulatory light touch on the new cable operator upstarts that were 
emerging across the country.  The common view then was that “com-
munity antenna television,” as it was called, supplemented broadcast-
ing by relaying signals to low-lying valley communities.207  It did not 
matter that the new video distribution technology complicated the 
network-affiliate broadcast model of video distribution.  The pre-
sumption (now, understood as a conceit) was that broadcasting could 
never really be displaced by the upstarts.  Broadcasters in this early 
                                                        
 203.  Id. at 829. 
 204.  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (2012) (“No cable system or other multichannel video pro-
gramming distributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station . . . .”). 
 205.  Id. § 325(b)(6); see also 17 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (“[T]he secondary transmission 
to the public of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission is 
actionable as an act of infringement.”). 
 206.  See supra notes 186–201 and accompanying text. 
 207.  See Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827. 
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period did not have any doubt about their importance as public trus-
tees of the airwaves. 
By the mid-1960s, however, as cable service spread, the common 
wisdom changed.  Cable was clearly becoming more than a supple-
ment to broadcasting; it had become a gatekeeper to many local mar-
kets and a potential competitor on video programming itself.  It was 
displacing the centrality of broadcasting. 
The FCC responded by promulgating rules that required cable 
operators to obtain the agreement of local stations to carry signals to 
subscribers in the local market.208  The agency also imposed pricing 
regulations on cable operators on the theory that they could abuse 
their new gatekeeping position in local markets by charging subscrib-
ers unreasonably high rates.209  Cable companies of course resisted 
these changes on the grounds that the FCC did not have the statutory 
authority to regulate them—that they were not broadcasters within 
the meaning of the Communications Act.210  The agency had argued 
that it could regulate cable service because it is ancillary to a service it 
otherwise has the authority to regulate—broadcasting.211  The Su-
preme Court affirmed the agency’s interpretation.212 
In 1984, a little more than a decade and a half later, Congress 
lifted these FCC regulations in local areas where there was “effective 
competition.”  The FCC subsequently defined this term broadly, al-
lowing cable providers to operate in most local markets free from 
price regulation.  The consequence of the 1984 amendment and its 
implementation by the FCC was a decade of high subscriber rates for 
cable service.213 
                                                        
 208.  See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 (1962) 
(denying transmitter permit application); Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Mi-
crowave Stations to Relay TV Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., No. 14895, Grant of Authori-
zations in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. for Microwave Sta-
tions Used to Relay TV Broad. Signals to Cmty. Antenna TV Sys., No. 15233, 2 F.C.C.2d 
725, 796–97 (1966) (adopting rules and regulations).  See generally LELAND JOHNSON, 
TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION (1994); Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Re-
transmission Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 
325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 102 (1996). 
 209.  See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).  
 210.  See id. at 172. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  See id. at 181. 
 213.  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (“Since rate deregulation, monthly rates for 
the lowest priced basic cable service have increased by 40 percent or more for 28 percent 
of cable television subscribers.  . . . The average monthly cable rate has increased almost 3 
times as much as the Consumer Price Index since rate deregulation.”). 
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By the early 1990s, as consumer worries about the rate of increase 
in cable prices intensified, broadcasters and consumer groups agitat-
ed for more protective legislation.  They set their sights on an 
amendment to the Communications Act that would effectively en-
large broadcasters’ leverage vis-à-vis cable operators and other “multi-
channel video programming distributors” (“MVPDs”).214  The com-
mon view was that cable providers, who, unlike broadcasters, had no 
positive responsibility to attend to the public interest, were drowning 
out free, over-the-air programming.215 
This push for reform succeeded.  Legislators came to believe 
that, in spite of the 1976 compromise, broadcasters were airing con-
tent with disproportionately little benefit in return.216  Cable opera-
tors now controlled access to local markets and reaped all of the ad-
vantages of the content that broadcasters were supplying.  This, 
according to the Senate Committee Report on the bill that eventually 
became the new law, unsettled the very foundation of over-the-air 
broadcasting.217  Free video programming, the Report explained, 
should never be “replaced by a system which requires consumers to 
pay for television service.”218  The new law would give broadcasters a 
new entitlement that they could use as leverage in negotiations with 
MVPDs over retransmission terms.  Among other things, for example, 
broadcasters and other content providers could negotiate to add new 
channels that providers would otherwise not carry.219 
Among other things, the Cable Television Consumer and Com-
petition Act of 1992 requires cable operators to carry local broadcast-
ers’ signals to local audiences if the local station elects to forgo nego-
                                                        
 214.  Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 305, 336-37 (1993). 
 215.  Id. at 335. 
 216.  S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 35 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168 (ob-
serving that “the Committee . . . does not believe that public policy supports a system un-
der which broadcasters in effect subsidize the establishment of their chief competitors.”); 
see also Federal Communications Commission, Implementation of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, 3004–05 (1993) (de-
termining that the 1992 Cable Act “created a new communications right in the broadcast-
er’s signal, completely separate from the programming contained in the signal.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 217.  S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168. 
 218.  Id. at 30, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169. 
 219.  Id. at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1168–69; see also 138 CONG. REC. S642-
01 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye) (“S. 12 permits the two in-
terested parties—the station and the cable system—to negotiate concerning their mutual 
interests.  It is of course in their mutual interests that these parties reach an agreement.”). 
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tiating on retransmission consent terms.220  Under the new law, more-
over, cable operators cannot receive compensation for carrying local 
broadcast signals when a local broadcaster elects to be a must-carry 
station.221  If, however, a broadcaster elects to proceed under the re-
transmission consent regime, cable television providers must settle on 
retransmission terms with broadcasters.  In the absence of an agree-
ment, the prior may not retransmit the latter’s signal.  Indeed, they 
must remove that broadcaster’s signal from their offerings and, 
moreover, may not import the distant signal of another affiliate within 
the same network. 
Crucially, this must-carry requirement rests on the popular faith 
(and, now, fiction) that “television broadcasting plays a vital role in 
serving the public interest.”222  The Supreme Court later ratified this 
view when, in response to a First Amendment challenge by cable op-
erators, it held that the must-carry provisions are content-neutral and 
justified by a legitimate government interest in providing free, over-
the-air public interest programming to consumers.223  Congress, the 
Court explained, decided that pay television could never displace this 
model. 
Of course, in today’s market, this account about free, over-the-air 
broadcasting is more romance than reality, as fewer people every year 
rely on television antennas to watch broadcast programs.224  Most 
                                                        
 220.  Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 6; 47 U.S.C. 
§ 325(b)(1)(B) (2012) (retransmission consent provision which also creates exception for 
must-carry provision at 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2012)).  The must-carry provisions essentially 
require cable service providers to carry a minimum number of broadcast signals based on 
the relative size of the local market.  47 U.S.C. § 534(a).   
 221.  47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(10).  There are a variety of reasons that would compel a broad-
caster to elect must-carry over retransmission consent.  See generally CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, 
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND OTHER FEDERAL RULES AFFECTING PROGRAMMER-
DISTRIBUTOR NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
REPORT RL34078(2007), available at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-
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 222.  S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1174. 
 223.  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997). 
 224.  See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 76 
Fed. Reg. 17071, 17072 (proposed Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) 
(“Since Congress enacted the retransmission consent regime in 1992, there have been sig-
nificant changes in the video programming marketplace.”).  But see Emily Steel, After Su-
preme Court Ruling, Aereo’s Rivals in TV Streaming Seize Opening, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/business/media/after-supreme-court-ruling-
aereos-rivals-in-tv-streaming-seize-opening.html. 
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viewers subscribe to cable or use their internet connection to watch 
programming at a time and place that is convenient.225 
In any event, Congress found broadcasting important enough to 
renew the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions in 1999 
and expanded them to cover direct broadcast satellite providers.226  
The result is that, today, broadcasters are assured that cable operators 
and satellite providers will carry their signal.  In this regard, the 1992 
Act has done precisely what its proponents hoped; it has given broad-
casters more leverage in their negotiations with MVPDs. 
These new entitlements, however, have introduced an important 
new wrinkle in the political economy of video distribution.  Ever since 
1992, broadcasters and other video content producers have routinely 
held-up popular time-sensitive programming (like major professional 
sports events) when it comes time to negotiate new retransmission 
terms.227  They do so to extract additional commitments from opera-
tors, including the promise to carry new or unpopular channels or to 
pay more per-subscriber fees for the channels they do carry.228 
Recognizing this moral hazard, in 1999 amendments to the 
Communications Act, Congress required the FCC to ensure that 
broadcasters negotiate with cable and satellite providers in good 
faith.229  Congress later imposed the “good faith” obligation on the 
cable operators and broadcasters a few years later.  The agency has yet 
to use this authority, however, to protect subscribers from the game of 
chicken that broadcasters play with cable operators whenever re-
transmission terms are up for renewal.  Congress is considering an ar-
ray of reforms in light of the lack of action from the FCC on the 
“good faith” provision.  The Video CHOICE (Consumers Have Op-
tions in Choosing Entertainment) Act, for example, would put an end 
                                                        
 225.  Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are ill-
suited to a marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”).  
 226.  See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining the term “provider of direct broad-
cast satellite service”); id. §§ 338, 614 (2012); see also Satellite Home Viewer Improvement 
Act of 1999 (Title I of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform 
Act of 1999), Pub. L. No. 106-113, Appendix I, § 1009(a), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-537–38.   
 227.  See, e.g., Ted Johnson, DirecTV Refuses to ‘Bail Out’ Time Warner Cable in Dodgers 
Standoff, VARIETY (July 29, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/tv/news/dodgers-tv-standoff-
time-warner-cable-says-yes-to-arbitration-but-directv-doesnt-bite-1201270994/; Chloe Alba-
nesius, Cablevision Sues Viacom Over Channel Bundling, PC MAGAZINE (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2415967,00.asp.  
 228.  See, e.g., Albanesius, supra note 227; David Wharton, PGA Championship faces CBS 
blackout for Time Warner Cable customers, LA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-pga-championship-cbs-television-
blackout-20130807,0,7602876.story#axzz2bNyTEHFj.  
 229.  47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii).   
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to broadcast networks’ blackouts during contract negotiations over 
retransmission terms.230  This proposed bill would also forbid broad-
casters from leveraging their popular networks to force cable opera-
tors to carry affiliated but less popular cable networks.231 
b.  Program Access 
Must-carry and retransmission consent represented significant re-
forms to video distribution law.  Like the public performance right 
and the statutory license, however, they comprise only a fraction of 
the whole public law in the legislative field of video distribution.  
Congress in 1992 also amended the Communications Act to prohibit 
MVPDs from “engag[ing] in unfair methods of competition or unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices.”232  The statute further requires the 
FCC to implement program access regulations that elaborate on this 
restriction.233 
Of course, as the statute was drafted in the early 1990s, it is not 
clear whether Congress meant to include online video distributors 
within the scope of the statute.  The statute defines an MVPD as: 
a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a mul-
tichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast 
satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program 
distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers 
or customers, multiple channels of video programming.234 
While the list in the definition is helpful, it is only illustrative; it is not 
exhaustive of covered providers.  It therefore leaves the legal obliga-
tions owed by and to the variety of emergent online video providers 
today in legal limbo, at least for now. 
The difficulty in the statute is in its reference to “channels.”  The 
question is whether  online video providers supply “multiple channels 
                                                        
 230.  H.R. 3719, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Joe Flint, Proposed Bills Seek to Rewrite Media Rule-
book, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-proposed-bills-media-
rules-20131212,0,2826769.story#axzz2nIXEN9ut. 
 231.  Another bill, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, would reform re-
transmission consent and compulsory licensing rules.  H.R. 3720, 113th Cong. (2013).  Cf. 
Alex Ben Block, “Two Bills Introduced in Congress to Stem TV Blackouts,” HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/two-bills-
introduced-congress-stem-665429. 
 232.  47 U.S.C. § 548(b). 
 233.  Id. § 548(c).  See generally 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1998), (FCC rules governing competitive 
access to cable programming). 
 234.  47 U.S.C. § 522; see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(e) (defining MVPD as “an entity en-
gaged in the business of making available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, mul-
tiple channels of video programming”). 
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of video programming” in the same way that cable providers do within 
the meaning of the Communications Act?235  The FCC has had the 
occasion to answer the question in the context of a dispute arising out 
of a video programmer’s decision to prematurely terminate its licens-
ing arrangement with Sky Angel, an operator of a subscription service 
that distributes the content of television networks in real time to tele-
visions equipped with internet-connected set-top boxes.236  The agen-
cy has tentatively rejected Sky Angel’s complaint about the termina-
tion, explaining that, based on the evidence before it, “Sky Angel does 
not provide its subscribers with a transmission path,” as the agency has 
interpreted the word.237  But the agency’s conclusion, again, was ten-
tative; it was only replying to Sky Angel’s request for a “temporary 
standstill” of the arrangement between it and Discovery, the content 
provider involved in the dispute.  The FCC has yet to enter a final or-
der in the case. 
This is no surprise.  The language of the statute is not clear.  Nor, 
as in Aereo, is it clear what the correct answer ought to be as a matter 
of law.  Indeed, since the dispute raises novel questions about a dis-
ruptive technology that the pertinent statute and regulations could 
not anticipate, the FCC in 2012 opened a proceeding in which it in-
vited public comment on the scope of the program access rules.238  
That proceeding and the adjudication that instigated it remain open 
today, to the frustration of Sky Angel, which recently had to suspend 
its video distribution services.239  There is little question that there are 
substantial competition concerns at stake.240  But, again, it is not at all 
                                                        
 235.  See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13).  Most notable among the newest generation of upstarts is 
Sky Angel, an operator of a subscription service that distributes the content of television 
networks in real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected set-top boxes.  The 
company enters into contracts with broadcasters and other video content producers like 
Discovery and Disney, for example, to supply content to its subscribers who, in turn, can 
watch the programming on their television as it hits the airwaves.  In this way, Sky Angel 
provides a service that is similar to that of traditional cable operators.  The significant dif-
ference is that, even while their subscribers watch the programs on high-definition televi-
sions, Sky Angel transmits the programming to subscribers over the Internet. 
 236.  Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3880 ¶ 4, 3883 ¶ 7 (2010) (emergency 
petition for temporary standstill).  The video programmer involved in the dispute, Discov-
ery Holding Company, qualifies as a competitor MVPD because its owner has a significant 
stake in such companies.  See News Corp., 23 FCC Rcd. 3265, 3273 ¶ 12 (2008) (noting the 
stakes of Discovery’s officers and directors in a competing MVPD, Liberty Media Corpora-
tion).   
 237.  Sky Angel, 25 FCC Rcd. at 3883 ¶ 7. 
 238.  Media Bureau, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079, 3082 ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2012) (notice). 
 239.  See Supplemental Comments of Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Nos. 12-80 & 12-83, (F.C.C. 
June 10, 2014), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521313509. 
 240.  Consider that Sky Angel has brought antitrust claims against other video pro-
grammers who have also prematurely terminated their arrangements with the online video 
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evident in the language of the statute or pertinent regulations how 
these disputes ought to be resolved as a matter of existing law.  All 
eyes now are on the FCC to resolve the question. 
All of this work deserves far more consideration than courts were 
willing to give it in the public performance cases.  It is one thing to 
ask courts to be more respectful, and another to determine how they 
should implement that deference as a matter of course.  I take up that 
challenge in Part III below. 
III. DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE 
As I show above, in Part II, the task of determining whether unli-
censed online video streaming of free, over-the-air broadcast pro-
gramming infringes on broadcasters’ public performance rights is 
complicated.  It cannot be done well simply by examining the plain 
text or specific legislative history of the Transmit Clause.  The perti-
nent statutes are like pieces of a 1,000-piece jigsaw puzzle.  Each piece 
furthers a specific objective that complements the others.241  Putting 
the pieces together, however, requires knowledge of where the others 
fit.  Congress gave to the Copyright Office and the FCC the assign-
ment of making sense of these various pieces when new technologies 
emerge. 
In the recent cases involving Aereo and FilmOn, however, federal 
judges did not convey anything but unwavering confidence in their 
institutional capacity and authority to determine the scope of the 
Transmit Clause.242  The courts interpreted the provision, unbothered 
by the various provisions and agency interpretations that bear on the 
question. 
In this Part, I propose that judges be far more mindful of their 
institutional authority and capacity than they have been in this set-
ting.  Scholars have studied the relative roles that courts, legislators, 
and agencies play when reviewing controversies across substantive ar-
eas associated with networked information technologies.  They have 
not, however, directed the same attention to defining the courts’ au-
thority or capacity to resolve disputes as complex and agency-
                                                        
provider.  The D.C. Circuit dismissed Sky Angel’s claim against the National Cable Satellite 
Corporation for pulling C-SPAN from its lineup, but only because Sky Angel did not plead 
sufficient facts to establish “concerted action,” not because the motivating concerns were 
not anticompetitive.  See Sky Angel v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–
02 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 241.  See supra Part II.B. 
 242.  See supra Part I.D. 
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involving as video distribution.  This Part rectifies this silence by draw-
ing on principles in administrative law doctrine. 
A.  Judicial Deference Generally 
There are two basic reasons for deference in judicial interpreta-
tion of public law.  First, courts consider deferring when they assume 
that there is a nontrivial risk that they might make a mistake about the 
substantive issue in dispute.  Even if their epistemic error can later be 
cured, their intervention could be destabilizing in the interim.  Ac-
cordingly, a court will defer if it also believes that another institution 
(that is, a legislature, an agency, or standard-setting organization) has 
a greater institutional capacity or expertise to make the right deci-
sions in the given subject matter.  Thus, A will elect to abide by B’s 
prior conclusion on the same question even though A might have re-
solved the issue differently in the first instance.243  Implicit in this con-
ception is the recognition that A always has the freedom to decide 
whether it should defer to the prior decision by B, but that B is far 
likelier to get it right in the first instance.244 
The second reason for deference is institutional.  Deference in 
these cases is an explicit recognition that certain institutions are by de-
sign responsible for enacting a limited range of laws or rules in the 
first instance.  This means A will defer to B because the former is A 
and the latter is B.245  It does not matter whether B is, from A’s per-
spective, right or wrong as a substantive matter.246 
Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy are constitution-
al principles that impose formal limits on judges’ authority to make 
legal decisions irrespective of what the best substantive resolution is.247  
The concept of separation of powers associates each of the branches 
of government with a specific and mutually exclusive role in federal 
governance.  This structural arrangement reflects the negotiated bal-
                                                        
 243.  See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072 
(2008). 
 244.  See id. at 1075. 
 245.  See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We 
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive de-
partment’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the princi-
ple of deference to administrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 246.  See id. at 845. 
 247.  Id. at 842–45. 
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ance reached during the founding period as well as a more general 
view of how constitutional democracies ought to function.248 
Democratic legitimacy, on the other hand, requires constituen-
cies to validate the public laws by which they must abide.  Under this 
conception, the elected branches are presumed to be superior to 
courts at resolving contested policy questions.249  They are accounta-
ble to, and representatives of, defined constituencies.250  At least theo-
retically, elections are the mechanisms through which elected officials 
stay in tune with constituents’ interests.  Federal courts, on the other 
hand, have no such constituencies and, as a result, no obligation to 
heed majoritarian demands on substantive outcomes.  Independent 
agencies are generally sheltered from the vagaries of electoral politics, 
but not as removed (or antimajoritarian) as courts are by design.  
They, like elected officials, are better able to “set[] the dimensions of 
social policy that may involve trades among the interests of broad 
groupings of citizens,” while “judges’ strengths lie in resolving discrete 
controversies between individuals, in which one wins, another loses, 
and broad social adjustments are secondary to the outcome of their 
concrete dispute.”251 
The doctrine of judicial review of agency action in administrative 
law embodies these two background constitutional norms: separation 
of powers and democratic legitimacy.  The Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council252 stands as the principle 
statement on these two norms.  Under the Chevron doctrine, judges 
defer to agencies’ substantive implementation of ambiguous statutes 
on the assumption that the agency officials who have been thinking 
longest and most systematically about the given problem are likely to 
have the most prudent policy solution.253  To be sure, courts will reject 
the agency action when it conflicts with congressional intent.254  But 
courts will defer to an agency’s judgment if they find that the agency 
action at issue reasonably accommodates competing interests, “the 
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered 
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision in-
                                                        
 248.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629–30 (1952) (Douglas, J., 
concurring); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 143–44, 
150, 159 (Simon & Brown 2012) (1690). 
 249.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Adminis-
trative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1257 (1992). 
 252.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 253.  Id. at 865–66. 
 254.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634–35 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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volves reconciling conflicting policies.”255  These elements are charac-
teristic of the work that many agencies undertake.  It is presumably 
for this reason that judicial reversals of agency action under Chevron 
are much less frequent than judicial affirmation.256 
Public choice critiques have not diminished Congress’s contin-
ued delegation to agencies and courts’ concomitant deference to 
agency action.257  To the contrary, Congress continues to delegate a 
wide range of responsibilities to agencies; agencies, in turn, have de-
veloped a variety of regulatory tools to implement legislative priori-
ties.258  Among other things, agency officials collect information about 
fields as they change, report on those findings to legislators and other 
policymakers, and adapt laws to changing circumstances.  Agencies 
are generally well-equipped to undertake these responsibilities in 
spite of concerns about regulatory capture and self-dealing.259 
Courts accordingly honor the various forms through which agen-
cies implement public law by deferring, or at least respecting, the lat-
ter’s efforts as a matter of course.  That is, courts have not adopted a 
one-size-fits-all regime of deference after Chevron.  Instead, they tailor 
their scrutiny of agency action to each case and legislative field.  Un-
der current doctrine, the level of deference courts give to agencies 
falls somewhere along a spectrum or “continuum”;260 it depends on 
the agency action under scrutiny, the specific statutory authority on 
which the agency bases its action, and the relative or unique institu-
tional expertise the agency has brought to bear.261  On one end of this 
spectrum, there are cases in which courts ignore, are indifferent to, or 
are altogether skeptical about the agency’s interpretations generally.  
These are cases where Congress has unambiguously decided not to 
confer lawmaking authority to an agency or where courts have tradi-
tionally assumed the authority to decide this kind of dispute in the 
                                                        
 255.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted). 
 256.  Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 696 n.91 
(2007). 
 257.  See, e.g., City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013) (holding 
that courts must defer under Chevron to an agency’s determination that it has jurisdiction 
to interpret an ambiguous statute).  See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: 
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010). 
 258.  See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001) (discussing when Chevron 
deference applies). 
 259.  See Barkow, supra note 257. 
 260.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1089–90 (2008).   
 261.  Id. at 228. 
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first instance.262  In these cases, courts apply a “pragmatic, multi-
factored methodology” that considers “statutory text and the whole 
act; legislative history and statutory purpose; the evolution of the stat-
ute through judicial and other precedents; and substantive policy 
canons.”263  At the other end are cases involving a statute through 
which Congress has delegated primary and nearly exclusive lawmak-
ing authority to an agency.  In these latter cases, courts assume a far 
more deferential posture.264  But the amount of deference a court 
gives to an agency can vary widely, from “consultative” to “super def-
erence,” depending on the nature of the authority at issue.265 
In the context of video distribution, Congress delegated specific 
authority to the Copyright Office and FCC.  These agencies are tasked 
with implementing the Copyright Act and the Communications Act as 
new and unanticipated technologies emerge.  Over the years, Con-
gress has given these agencies broad authority to make legal sense of 
new technologies in the first instance.  I outline those duties here, 
based on my account in Part II. 
Reporting.  Both agencies are explicitly charged with the task of 
collecting information from stakeholders about the state of affairs in 
video distribution.  That is, they collect information about prevalent 
market uses, consumer habits, judicial interpretations, and emergent 
technologies.  They play this role, again, because there is only so 
much that Congress can do in this legislative field.  In any event, 
agencies are far better equipped and staffed to collect such infor-
mation.  But Congress also has charged both agencies with the re-
sponsibility of reporting their findings to legislators, other federal 
agencies, and, on request, to courts.  This role is precisely the sort of 
task an agent for Congress should undertake.266 
Adapting Current Laws.  Both agencies also have the authority to 
promulgate rules and offer guidance on substantive questions when 
the governing statute is ambiguous or unclear.  They do this in ways 
that Congress, as a practical matter, simply cannot.  Above, in Part II, 
I discussed at least two examples that showcase this important feature 
                                                        
 262.  See infra Part III.B (discussing electronic surveillance). 
 263.  See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1117.  
 264.  See infra Part III.B (discussing broadband network management). 
 265.  See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1098–99. 
 266.  While the Copyright Office has the responsibility to report to Congress and the 
courts on copyright related matters, it is a subordinate agency within the Library of Con-
gress.  See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).  The current Register of Copyrights and her prede-
cessor are on record as advocating the restructuring of the Copyright Office as an inde-
pendent agency.  See Letter of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, to Representative 
John Conyers, Jr. (Mar. 23, 2015). 
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of their responsibilities administration: first, the FCC’s rulemakings 
addressed to cable operators and broadcasters in the 1960s and, se-
cond, the Copyright Office’s consistent determination over the course 
of the past decade and a half that internet transmissions are not in-
cluded in the compulsory licensing regime.  In both cases, the agen-
cies promulgated a rule or interpretation to fill a legislative gap until 
Congress formally amends the old statute or enacts a new one to re-
solve a substantive ambiguity occasioned by the emergence of a dis-
ruptive new video distribution technology like online streaming. 
Convening.  Hand-in-hand with the responsibility of collecting in-
formation is the important role both agencies have in convening dis-
cussions and negotiations between the various stakeholders in the 
field.  Congress has given to the FCC in particular broad authority to 
arbitrate or mediate disputes.  In this capacity, the FCC is best posi-
tioned to understand the relative priorities of service providers, con-
sumer advocacy groups, and technologists.  The FCC’s rulemaking 
proceedings also operate as opportunities for the various stakeholders 
to convene formally.  The agency, in turn, relies on the exchange of 
ideas to formulate policy that is presumably reflective of the various 
rival interests. 
Expertise.  Finally, over the years, the Copyright Office and the 
FCC have developed a uniquely deep understanding of the nature of 
communication markets.  The FCC in particular has lawyers, econo-
mists, and technologists on staff to elucidate new developments and 
trends.  The Copyright Office, on the other hand, operates as a con-
vener, a research arm for Congress, and an administrator for licensing 
regimes across substantive areas.  Both agencies have acquired this 
deep level of knowledge in ways that exceed anything close to what 
Congress or the courts have. 
Together, these various activities paint a picture of broad respon-
sibility.  Over time, Congress has actively chosen to give the Copyright 
Office and the FCC substantial power to make sense of new commu-
nications technologies as they emerge.  Because Congress has given 
the FCC and the Copyright Office these powers, courts have accord-
ingly afforded deference to those agencies on the scope of video dis-
tribution law. 
B.  Judicial Deference and Communication Technologies 
Institutional authority and capacity are not the only justifications 
for judicial deference.  Different substantive areas warrant different 
kinds of expertise.  In the context of copyright law, courts are reluc-
tant to expand existing copyright protections to novel communication 
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technologies “without explicit legislative guidance.”267  The Supreme 
Court affirmed this principle in Sony v. Universal City Studios.268  In 
Sony, it found that manufacturers of videocassette recorders are not 
secondarily liable for viewers’ reproduction of copyright protected 
television programs.269  It determined that users generally record 
those programs for their personal use (that is, they “time-shift”).270  
The Court held that these “substantial noninfringing uses” do not 
cause the requisite level of harm to the copyright owners.271 
The Sony Court explained that judges are generally less capable 
of “accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing in-
terests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology” than 
Congress is.272  It cited the well-established view “that the protection 
given to copyrights is wholly statutory.”273  The Court noted that this is 
why courts have been reluctant “to expand the protections afforded 
by the copyright without explicit legislative guidance.”274 
The 1976 Copyright Act itself is evidence of this interaction be-
tween courts and Congress.  The Sony Court cited Teleprompter and 
Fortnightly, both overturned by the Act, as cases that triggered a legis-
lative fix to the statutory public performance right.275  Courts accord-
ingly, the Sony Court noted, must err on the side of caution before 
broadening protections.  “Sound policy, as well as history,” the Court 
explained, “supports our consistent deference to Congress when ma-
jor technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted mate-
                                                        
 267.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing, inter 
alia, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) and Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
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U.S. at 431). 
 268.  464 U.S. 417, 446–47. 
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 270.  Id. at 449–50. 
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 272.  Id. at 431.  
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Id. (citing, inter alia, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 
394 (1974) and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)). 
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rials.”276  It asserted as much even as the fair use analysis is characteris-
tically fact-intensive and best suited to adjudication.277 
But, to be sure, the reasoning in Sony is not what most students of 
administrative law generally associate with the idea of deference.  As I 
outlined above, deference, at least as it comes up in administrative law 
doctrine, refers to the posture courts assume when Congress has 
charged an agency with interpreting or implementing the statutory 
regime at issue in a case.  Sony was not about that kind of deference.  
The dispute in Sony concerned a question—the scope of the fair use 
defense278—that courts have assumed the responsibility of resolving in 
the first instance.279  But it was during the course of its fair use analysis 
that the Court explicitly second-guessed its own capacity and institu-
tional authority to stretch the law to apply to the new technology at 
issue.280  It expressed this reticence as deference to Congress. 
That same principle should have applied in the cases involving 
Aereo and FilmOn, but it did not.  Indeed, after reading Aereo, one 
might think that courts need not be so deferential to Congress or 
agencies generally when they adjudicate disputes involving novel 
communication technologies.  In their opinions, neither Justice Brey-
er nor Justice Scalia for a second considered whether the Court was 
the right forum to decide in the first instance whether the Transmit 
Clause reaches online video streaming—a technology that was un-
known to most people until just a few years ago.281  Their assumption 
                                                        
 276.  Id.; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) 
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 281.  See supra Part I.D. 
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was that courts have the authority to and are capable of resolving such 
disputes by simply examining no more than the statutory provision in 
dispute. 
This proposition sounds right for two reasons.  First, Congress 
has not delegated to any agency the authority to implement the 
Transmit Clause in the way it has delegated administrative authority 
to implement other statutory provisions like, for example, Section 111 
of the Copyright Act.  Second, courts cannot abdicate their positive 
responsibility of adjudicating disputes brought before them.  At a 
minimum, they must resolve whether a case is justiciable in the first 
place.  They must decide, for example, whether there is a ripe contro-
versy worthy of their attention or whether they have jurisdiction to 
hear the matter.  They cannot defer those questions to any other insti-
tution. 
More generally, courts routinely decide how to interpret contest-
ed terms without consulting other institutions.  They decide which re-
sources or kinds of authorities are worth considering and following.  
Courts decide, for example, whether and to what extent legislative 
history or other evidence of congressional intent matters when de-
termining the scope of a substantive right or obligation.282  They do 
this as a matter of interpretive judicial philosophy ex ante283 or be-
cause, pursuant to the statutory provision at issue, they must consider 
certain legislative factors in their analysis.284  Or they decide that they 
should review certain agency actions in a certain way.285  That is, pur-
suant to their native duty to say what the law is, they devise standards 
of judicial review and deference to account for constitutional or insti-
tutional considerations unmentioned in the legislation at issue.286 
We might assume that it is with this background in mind that the 
courts in the cases involving Aereo and FilmOn appeared to have tak-
en it as an article of faith that they could and should decide what 
Congress meant by including the term “publicly” in the definition of 
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performance in the Transmit Clause.  But the decision about how to 
interpret contested terms is not as obvious or unimportant as the 
Aereo opinions’ silence on the matter suggests.  In cases involving dis-
ruptive networked communications technologies generally, courts 
routinely convey humility, or at least self-awareness, about the limits of 
their institutional authority or capacity.   
Courts have done this recently in cases involving issues as dispar-
ate as electronic communication surveillance by law enforcement of-
ficials on the one hand, and broadband network management prac-
tices of internet service providers on the other.  As to electronic 
surveillance, courts have not hesitated to say in the first instance what 
the Fourth Amendment allows.287  Yet, even in this area, the Supreme 
Court has wrung its hands demonstrably about whether it or Congress 
is better suited to defining the scope of privacy protection in cases in-
volving technologically novel surveillance techniques.288  They do this 
notwithstanding their uncontroverted exclusive authority to interpret 
constitutional provisions.289  They even have invited Congress to pro-
vide guidance on how to define privacy in recent cases involving sur-
veillance techniques that rely on novel networked communications 
technologies like location tracking.290  And, yet, at the same time, 
courts have recognized that they are at the peak of their institutional 
authority when they are asked to resolve disputes about the substan-
tive scope of a constitutional right.  Outside of a narrow range of stat-
utes through which Congress has delegated policymaking authority to 
federal law enforcement officials to define the contours of statutory 
privacy rights,291 agencies do not have an articulated responsibility to 
define the scope of protection from electronic surveillance under the 
Fourth Amendment.292 
                                                        
 287.  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).  
 288.  See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).   
 289.  See Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total 
Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 512–14 (2014). 
 290.  See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[C]oncern about new in-
trusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intru-
sions.”).  Justice Alito flatly observed in his concurring opinion in Jones that, “in circum-
stances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may 
be legislative.”  Id. at 964. 
 291.  See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). 
 292.  Of course, this is not to say that agencies do not have some rulemaking authority 
on privacy law outside of law enforcement surveillance.  See, e.g., Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Patient 
Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005). 
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The governance of local internet service providers, on the other 
hand, is very different from the governance of law enforcement sur-
veillance techniques.  Importantly, local broadband network man-
agement is not a constitutional matter.  As technologies change, the 
FCC implements the objectives set out in the Communications Act 
through a wide range of regulatory activities.293  Nevertheless, the fed-
eral courts have not hesitated to define or reflect on the obligations of 
internet service providers under the Communications Act.294  They 
have done so, however, within the bounds of transsubstantive defer-
ence doctrines and administrative law doctrine generally.295  Courts 
have decided that the agencies to which Congress has delegated au-
thority are best situated to interpret the pertinent statutory terms. 
As to both areas, electronic surveillance and broadband network 
management, courts are always explicitly mindful of the limits of their 
relative institutional authority and capacity.  Scholars of these two ar-
eas in particular, too, have attended to the courts’ relative institution-
al role.296 
C.  Towards a Theory of Implied Delegation in Video Distribution Law 
1.  Deference in Action 
Should we treat the Transmit Clause as a provision that courts 
have the exclusive responsibility of elaborating in the first instance 
(like the Fourth Amendment)?297  Or is it more like a provision in a 
regulatory regime that a federal agency has the delegated authority to 
administer (like that set out in the Communications Act)?  Or does it 
fit somewhere in between?   
                                                        
 293.  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 157, 1302(a) (2012); see also id. § 201(b) (authorizing 
the agency to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public in-
terest to carry out” provisions of the statute). 
 294.  See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 
600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 295.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–84, 
991 (2005) (applying Chevron to agency interpretation of definitional terms in Communi-
cations Act); cf. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870–72 (2013) (applying 
Chevron to agency interpretation of jurisdictional provision). 
 296.  See generally Kerr, supra note 9; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2013); Sylvain, supra note 151, at 795; Olivier Sylvain, Internet 
Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 259–61 (2010). 
 297.  To be sure, the Copyright Clause in the Constitution does not engage courts in 
the way the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does.  The latter enlists courts to 
measure executive overreach.  The former, on the other hand, explicitly authorizes Con-
gress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by setting “limits” on creators’ 
exclusive rights to their copyrighted works.  U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  But that structural 
difference went unnoticed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Aereo. 
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Chevron does not really answer those questions, but another ca-
nonical Supreme Court case in modern administrative law doctrine 
provides important guidance.  In United States v. Mead,298 the Supreme 
Court identified the various considerations that judges must generally 
take into account when deciding whether to defer or what level of 
deference courts should give to agencies.299  The Mead Court held that 
courts must inquire into how and whether Congress intended to del-
egate to the Customs Office the authority to implement the Harmo-
nized Tariff Schedule of the United States before scrutinizing the va-
lidity of the agency’s action.300  If a court finds no such intention, then 
it will be less deferential than required under Chevron.301  Courts only 
have to consider “the thoroughness” of the agency’s analysis, “the va-
lidity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.”302 
After Mead, one of the key questions for federal courts is whether 
Congress has one way or another delegated to the agency at issue the 
authority to interpret and administer an ambiguous provision with 
the “force of law.”303  Deference—whether obedience or simply 
weighty consideration—will depend on whether the agency’s inter-
pretation is “made in pursuance of official duty” and premised on 
“more specialized experience and broader investigations and infor-
mation than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”304 
This inquiry, sometimes called Chevron Step Zero,305 must come 
before the reviewing court analyzes the substantive merits of the 
agency action at issue.  The Court in Mead explained that an agency 
can manifest its expertise in a “great variety of ways.”306  Depending on 
what the governing statute allows, an agency may manifest congres-
sional intent by rulemaking, adjudication, enforcement, or any other 
number of methods.307  Courts, meanwhile, must be prepared to hon-
or “the spectrum of possible agency action” that Congress has permit-
                                                        
 298.  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 299.  Id. at 227–34. 
 300.  Id. at 226–28; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983 (discussing Mead). 
 301.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–28; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 
(2000). 
 302.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 303.  Id. at 226–27, 229.   
 304.  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 305.  Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006). 
 306.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 235–36. 
 307.  Id. at 236. 
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ted.308  Deference, the Court explained, must be “tailor[ed]” to the 
variety of forms that agency action may take.309  Otherwise, courts 
would be unresponsive to the range of regulatory strategies that Con-
gress pursues to further complex legislative purposes.310  Mead in this 
regard encourages agencies to be flexible in undertaking their dele-
gated authority and, just as importantly, requires courts to consider 
the “variety of ways” in which Congress may have implicitly delegated 
to an agency the power to implement the statute at issue.311  This rule 
does not compromise judicial authority to scrutinize agency action, as 
much as impose on courts the sensible duty of being self-aware of the 
limits of their interpretive authority.312  The doctrine has courts 
choose between obeying the agency interpretation at issue, treating 
the agency view on the matter as a “constituent element[] of its own 
decision, as persuasive if not controlling,” or “as simply irrelevant.”313 
2.  An Alternative to Indifference in Aereo 
The various courts that heard the recent disputes involving Aereo 
and FilmOn did not consider the question of whether they ought to 
consult legal analysis of online video distribution by the Copyright Of-
fice or the FCC.314  In their silence, the courts seemed to presume that 
they alone have the authority or capacity to define the scope of pro-
tection under the Transmit Clause. 
As a formal matter, they are not necessarily wrong.  Congress did 
not explicitly delegate the authority to interpret the Transmit Clause 
to any institution and, under current doctrine, federal courts are not 
obliged to apply Chevron deference to an agency interpretation unless 
Congress manifests an intention to authorize that agency “to be able 
to speak with the force of law.”315  Neither the Copyright Office nor 
the FCC have an explicit obligation under the Copyright Act to fill 
gaps in the Transmit Clause or promulgate binding legal rules that 
interpret the public performance right.  It is likely for this reason that 
courts did not convey any doubt that they could ignore statements by 
                                                        
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993). 
 311.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–05 
(2005) (Breyer, J. concurring) (discussing Mead). 
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 313.  Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect 
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 314.  See supra Part I.D. 
 315.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
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the Copyright Office or the FCC on how to treat online video distri-
bution.316  For the courts, those agencies are to be ignored until a liti-
gant challenges their interpretations in court. 
But existing doctrine, especially after Mead, does not require that 
courts be inattentive to agency interpretations of public law in fields 
about which Congress has assumed that they are expert.317  While 
there is no explicit delegation of authority to interpret the Transmit 
Clause, one can infer from the Copyright Act that the Copyright Of-
fice has the authority to make sense of that provision when new tech-
nologies emerge.  This seems especially sensible in the video distribu-
tion context, where the Copyright Office and the FCC have been, and 
must be, very active. 
As I explained above, pursuant to legislative command,318 the 
Copyright Office and FCC have issued reports and administered pro-
ceedings on how disruptive emergent online video streaming applica-
tions are and whether they square with the terms of current law.319  To 
be sure, these agencies have not had the occasion (never mind the 
explicit authority) to say anything about how or whether unauthor-
ized online video streaming of broadcast programming infringes 
broadcasters’ public performance right under the Transmit Clause.  
But the Copyright Office and the FCC have committed substantial re-
sources and expertise to the general question on which the Aereo ma-
jority rested its holding: whether online streaming is like cable televi-
sion service.  Before the Court decided Aereo, both agencies decided 
that online video distribution is not sufficiently like cable to warrant 
protection under at least two other related provisions under the Cop-
yright Act and the Communications Act.320 
It is peculiar that existing doctrine could allow courts to ignore 
the substantial efforts that the Copyright Office and the FCC have ex-
pended on the point.  At a minimum, nothing in Mead or administra-
                                                        
 316.  The matter would have been different if the litigants had argued or briefed the 
point.  
 317.  Cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, 229 (“It can be apparent from the agency’s generally 
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the 
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in the statute 
or fills in a space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not have intent as 
to a particular result.  When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing 
court must accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point 
at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 318.  See supra Part II. 
 319.  See supra Part III.A. 
 320.  See supra Part II.B. 
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tive law doctrine generally forbids courts from entertaining their con-
clusions. 
One might even assume that current administrative law doctrine 
empowers courts to consider agency interpretations of related provi-
sions in the legislative field.  There are at least two reasons for this.  
First, courts defer to agency interpretations even when they are not a 
party to the litigation before them.  This is true across different sub-
stantive areas, including matters related to the Aereo and FilmOn 
video distribution applications.  Consider again the ivi case.321  In ivi, 
in a dispute concerning the scope of coverage of the compulsory li-
censing provision, the Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Of-
fice’s repeated determination that online video applications are not 
like cable and, therefore, not entitled to a compulsory license to re-
transmit broadcast programming.322  The panel reached this conclu-
sion even though the Copyright Office was not a party to the litiga-
tion.  The agency’s delegated authority and expertise in the legislative 
field were enough to warrant deference.323   
Second, in Mead, the Court sought to accommodate the variety of 
ways in which Congress grants authority to agencies.324  Sometimes 
Congress delegates to agencies the responsibility of promulgating 
rules that carry the force of law.  Courts will give such agency actions 
Chevron deference.  Sometimes, however, Congress allows agencies to 
make “interpretive choices” that do not bind judges.325  Even in these 
cases, courts defer, conveying something between “near indifference” 
to simple respect to “substantial deference.”326  In any event, the spe-
cific features of the agency action shape the “fair measure of defer-
ence” that courts choose to give.327  The question in any such case is 
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whether the agency’s interpretations bear any of the hallmarks of au-
thority and expertise worthy of consideration. 
I accordingly propose here a framework for judicial interpreta-
tion of a statutory provision that is separate but intertwined with a 
general regulatory regime in which Congress has delegated adminis-
trative or lawmaking responsibilities to an agency.  The occasion for 
this kind of judicial review would be, as in Aereo, a dispute between 
private parties about the applicability of an ambiguous provision to a 
novel technology otherwise regulated by the agency.  The agency’s in-
terpretation would be entitled to consideration to the extent it has au-
thority to interpret a significantly related statutory provision.328 
Under the approach I propose here, the judicial inquiry about 
how far the public performance right reaches would not begin and 
end with an analysis of the Transmit Clause or related provisions in 
the Copyright Act.  Courts also would as a matter of course consider 
whether the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined whether a 
new video distribution technology is too unfamiliar (too disruptive) to 
fall within the ambit of the compulsory licensing, must-carry, retrans-
mission consent, or program access laws—or, in the terms on which 
the Aereo court relied, whether those agencies have decided whether 
video streaming is like cable or not. 
Attending to all of the public law of video distribution—
legislation and agency action in the field—would best effectuate con-
gressional intent.  After all, the governing statutes reflect Congress’ 
decision that the balance of the diverse interests in the market for 
video programming distribution ought to be resolved in the first in-
stance by the Copyright Office and the FCC.  Legislators concluded 
that those agencies are best situated to assess the efficacy of current 
law in light of new innovations.  They charged those agencies with the 
responsibility of keeping abreast of changes in the market, reporting 
those findings to Congress, and promulgating binding regulations 
when necessary to effectuate legislative intent.  These are the very 
kinds of regulatory interventions to which the Court has pointed to 
justify routine judicial deference to agencies.329 
Courts of general jurisdiction do not have the same claim to ex-
pertise or institutional authority under these circumstances.330  Nor 
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can courts administer the careful policy balance embodied in video 
distribution law in the way that those agencies do on a case-by-case ba-
sis.  Of course, courts have an important role to play.  If neither Con-
gress nor the pertinent agencies have determined (or can agree on) 
how or whether any provision applies to a particular dispute, they 
should employ the full sweep of interpretive tools to make sense of 
the law at issue as they normally would—that is, as the majority and 
dissent did in Aereo.  Courts in these cases would do so based on the 
assumption that they are the first to address the question generally or 
that, in their protracted silence, Congress and the agencies expect as 
much from the courts.331  In this regard, my proposal does nothing to 
diminish public law interpretation by courts. 
But when the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined that a 
new technology is too disruptive to justify applying a related provision 
in the Copyright Act or the Communications Act,332 as they have here, 
courts ought to defer to or at least consider that prior agency inter-
pretation, apart from whether it would produce a different result.  In 
this regard, my proposal would inject a degree of humility and disci-
pline to the interpretive endeavor that to this point has been sorely 
missing in this legislative field.333  More generally, it would be a cor-
rective to the sense of interpretive exceptionalism in judicial interpre-
tation. 
As it relates to judicial review of disputes concerning the applica-
tion of the public performance right to online video streaming, my 
proposal would require courts to make several inquiries.  Courts 
should take into account whether the Copyright Office or the FCC 
has considered whether the emergent technology is covered by com-
pulsory licensing, retransmission consent, must-carry, or program ac-
cess laws before proceeding to an analysis of the scope of broadcast-
ers’ public performance rights.  If neither agency has spoken on the 
matter, I propose that courts engage in a de novo analysis of the ap-
plicability of the public performance right as they would a provision 
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that no single agency has the responsibility of administering or im-
plementing.  If, however, the Copyright Office or the FCC has indeed 
determined one way or another how or whether a corollary provision 
applies to the new technology at issue, I would require courts to defer 
to that agency’s interpretation as a matter of course.334 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Online video streaming applications have turned the traditional 
broadcast model inside out.  Users today control what and how they 
watch video programming.  These services are so different today from 
what existed just a generation ago that, until a divided Supreme Court 
decided the matter last term, courts did not agree on how such ser-
vices square with existing law.  Courts were uncertain, for example, 
about whether the new technologies are sufficiently novel not to be 
covered under the public performance right, a provision that Con-
gress included in the 1976 Copyright Act specifically to address the 
unique political economy of cable retransmission of broadcast pro-
gramming. 
Today, at a time when so much in the market for internet-based 
applications and services is contested, I argue here that courts should 
be far more careful in their application of the public performance 
right to disruptive technologies like online video streaming than they 
have been.  Instead, they should defer to the agencies to which Con-
gress has delegated the authority to interpret interacting provisions 
under the Copyright Act—that is, to all of the public law that Con-
gress has set in motion.  Courts, of course, should continue to be at 
their most searching when they are asked to interpret a provision that 
they have the authority to define in the first instance.  But they also 
should be far more careful when they are asked to make sense of a 
provision in a complex legislative field for which Congress has given 
to agencies the primary responsibility of updating and implementing 
during dramatic times of change. 
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